tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8493138.post115222101691443746..comments2024-02-03T10:37:28.343-05:00Comments on Madman of Chu: China, North Korea, and the USMadman of Chuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12867538212499011319noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8493138.post-1153581211958520932006-07-22T11:13:00.000-04:002006-07-22T11:13:00.000-04:00Dear Matt, It is difficult to predict exactly ho...Dear Matt,<BR/><BR/> It is difficult to predict exactly how North Korea would respond to the kind of diplomatic shift I propose. Yes, they would do everything they could to prevent the US and its allies from securing any advantage from negotiations, but I don't think that simply ignoring such overtures would be an option. More than 1 million North Koreans died in the Korean War, which was fought to unify the Penninsula and is still a living memory among the older generation of North Korea's leaders. Anyone who advocated simply ignoring US overtures of reunification talks would probably invite stiff resistance from military and party leaders who would wonder why a goal that so many had died for wasn't worth at least trying to achieve through diplomacy. Even in a system as autocratic as North Korea's there are limits to how strictly discipline may be maintained, and reunification is one issue (perhaps the only issue) on which the KCP leadership is vulnerable- they cannot dictate a course of action which runs too much counter to the very deeply held feelings and convictions of its ranking members. I don't imagine that US overtures of reunification talks would produce a predictable outcome overnight, but it would give the US the initiative again in dealing with the KCP and break the current diplomatic stalemate. <BR/><BR/>I don't think there is a clear succesor to KJI waiting in the wings, nor is waiting out his tenure a good plan. The next person to fill his shoes is not likely to act very differently than he has. As much as KJI is touted as a "madman" (and to whatever extent such characterizations may be true), the long term problem with North Korea is a systemic one that requires proactive solutions. The US has to either come up with some new approach to relations with North Korea or accept indefinite stasis.Madman of Chuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12867538212499011319noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8493138.post-1152992452996050842006-07-15T15:40:00.000-04:002006-07-15T15:40:00.000-04:00"If the US would drop "regime change" in favor of ..."If the US would drop "regime change" in favor of a policy of "reconciliation and reunification" on the Korean Penninsula as a whole, such a move would rock both Pyongyang and Beijing back on their heels."<BR/><BR/>The policy shift that you describe makes sense but how would Washington get North Korea to the table for those types of discussions? The Dear Leader would do everything in his power to sabotage such talks. Beijing would probably drag their heels since as you point out, they need NK to be a one party state.<BR/><BR/>I am also curious if KJI has a successor picked for himself and what might be know about that individual.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8493138.post-1152364164650711222006-07-08T09:09:00.000-04:002006-07-08T09:09:00.000-04:00Dear Jonathan,You're right that this inference is ...Dear Jonathan,<BR/><BR/>You're right that this inference is the one upon which my whole argument hangs. It's hard to predict how the collapse of North Korea would impact China politically, but the Tiananmen movement of 1989 was set in motion by far less dramatic events. At the very least Beijing would be wise to fear such a contigency, and if their reaction to the first general presidential election on Taiwan is any gauge they do. <BR/><BR/>Dear Larry,<BR/><BR/> Japan shares the same interests as the US and South Korea in the strategic standoff on the Penninsula. Japan has been a consistent target of aggressive KCP rhetoric and provocation (remember the missile fired over Japan recently). In terms of cracking the North's isolation, however, Japan's potential direct influence is negligible. Japan provides 11% of North Korea's current imports, but those amount to only $2.8 billion (as opposed to the South's $175.6 billion). The greatest influence Japan can have upon the strategic situation in Korea is indirectly, through lobbying Washington to change US policy. My sense is that Tokyo has not staked out an independent position and has general followed the line coming out of Washington, but I could be wrong on that score.Madman of Chuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12867538212499011319noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8493138.post-1152316231670927122006-07-07T19:50:00.000-04:002006-07-07T19:50:00.000-04:00I would be interested in your analysis, if you wer...I would be interested in your analysis, if you were to overlay Japan on the map you have laid out. Japan is the number two economy of the world. How does it fit into the relationship between China and Korea? It must be a rather large part of the scenario you have talked about, but you haven’t mentioned Japan.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8493138.post-1152229122582966452006-07-06T19:38:00.000-04:002006-07-06T19:38:00.000-04:00The democraticization of North Korea following on ...<I>The democraticization of North Korea following on the heels of full-suffrage elections in Taiwan would send shock waves through the PRC that could threaten the unravelling of Beijing's single-party autocracy.</I><BR/><BR/>This is key, and I'm not entirely convinced that it's true, or that the CCP believes it to be true, but it certainly would explain a fair bit. <BR/><BR/>It is true that the true fall of the Soviet Union began when Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention, and CCP leadership has been very clear on their desire to avoid a repeat of the Soviet denuoument....Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com