Since the first weeks of Donald
Trump’s presidency it has been clear that his re-election campaign would be
marked by an unprecedented amount of belligerence and polarizing vitriol, as he
has appealed consistently to the same core of base supporters that gave him a
surprise minority victory in 2016. But with the November election approaching,
he has increasingly struggled to formulate a message. The exigencies of the
pandemic have blunted some of his most dependable rhetorical weapons. His
posture as a hero of the economy has been undermined by a steep recession, the
usual distractions of racially charged pronouncements and celebrity feuds have
been eclipsed by the daily grind of public health statistics. Anger and
division are Trump’s stock-in-trade, but anger and division are difficult to
sustain when everyone is in the same miserable boat.
It is for
this reason that China
has become so fundamental to Trump’s re-election strategy. In some respects the
choice of China
as a scapegoat might seem compelled by circumstance. Because the pandemic first
began in Wuhan, Trump was naturally drawn to
deflect responsibility by repeatedly referring to Covid-19 as “the China
Virus,” and to proclaim that the Americans experiencing economic duress are not
to blame for their own misfortune, “China is.”
But Trump’s
use of China
to drive an electoral narrative runs much more broadly and deeply than simple
scapegoating. The intensity and variety of maneuvers undertaken by the White
House in recent weeks indicate the pursuit of a much more ambitious agenda. By
manipulating Sino-U.S. relations, the Trump team hopes to manufacture an issue
on which they can run through November 3.
This recent
campaign is in some sense an extension of the trade war with China pursued
by the White House for the past three years, but it is a new edifice being
built on an old foundation. A resolution of the trade war (if there is ever to
be one) has effectively been deferred until after the election. Meaningful
diplomacy regarding Chinese abuses in Hong Kong (where a largely peaceful
movement for democracy has been met by the imposition of a draconian and
illiberal “security law”) and Xinjiang (where as many as a million members of
the Uighur minority have been detained in labor camps and forced to undergo
“re-education”) has likewise been abandoned, all in favor of a series of
escalating and gratuitous provocations, none of which is tied to discrete
long-term policy goals.
The first clear
signs of this campaign came in June. That month saw a staged controversy,
played out in right-wing media, over whether the President’s insistence on
using phrases like “Kung Flu” was racially inflammatory (it was). Since then,
the White House has floated a series of confrontations with Beijing, each more aggressive than the last.
In July
the administration closed the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas,
on the pretext that it was engaged in espionage activities (no specific
evidence or charges were announced). About nine days later Trump announced a
pending ban on the Chinese social media platform TikTok and messaging service
WeChat, a move that had been teased earlier in a speech by Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo. The administration’s rationale for this move was as vague as that
for the closing of the Houston
consulate. The information gathered from users by TikTok and WeChat was said to
pose a security threat, despite the fact that this information is no different
than that gathered by platforms such as Facebook or Instagram. The most recent
move in this campaign was a trip by Health and Human Services Secretary Alex
Azar to Taiwan.
This visit from a Cabinet-level official to Taiwan
was unprecedented in the interval since formal recognition of the PRC, and was
deliberately calculated to provoke CCP leaders in Beijing.
All of
these provocations were aimed at eliciting a hostile and inflammatory response
from Beijing.
Why? What is the logic of inducing this form of artificial standoff? The
perceived advantages of a “China
crisis” in the current election campaign works on several levels for the Trump
team.
As noted above, Trump himself is
only really capable of running a form of politics derived from the reality
television genre that propelled him onto the national stage. It is rooted in
drama and conflict; he must show supporters that he is “vanquishing enemies”
daily. From the outset his chosen antagonists were fellow Americans or
residents of the US:
people of color, Muslims, women, LGBTQ citizens, undocumented immigrants, Democrats.
Trump’s recent and great misfortune
is that circumstance has shouldered him with an enemy that is difficult to
caricature or manipulate: the Covid-19 pandemic. An effective campaign against
the virus would require him to reconcile and unite groups that he had until now
counted on pitting against one-another. This would require him to completely
reconstruct his “brand” in a way that he lacks the will and talent to accomplish.
He thus needs an enemy that will be intuitively recognizable to his base
supporters, and that can produce fear and anger sufficiently intense to
distract them from their fear of the Covid-19 virus.
China serves perfectly in this
regard. Since his first speech about “Mexican rapists” Trump has appealed to
racial animosity. He thus can rely on his most enthusiastic supporters to
accept that the same information held by Facebook executives is much more
dangerous when collected by Chinese corporations. If he can goad the Chinese
into a sufficiently belligerent response, fear of a “yellow peril” might
displace (or be conflated with) fear of the Covid-19 pandemic sufficiently to
shore up support among Trump’s core followers.
Beyond
this, a manufactured “China
crisis” serves Trump’s political needs in other, more particular respects.
Since first taking office in 2017, he has labored under the strong impression
that he may have been compromised by Russia. His hostility to any
investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election and his extraordinary
deference to Vladimir Putin at occasions such as the Helsinki summit cast suspicion on his
integrity as a guardian of US national interests.
One of the
most basic tactics underpinning Trump’s political success has been his playing
of an “equivalency game.” In 2016 his personal corruption was a matter of
public record, so by way of normalizing his candidacy and giving implicit
permission to centrist voters to join his coalition, he campaigned (both on his
own and through surrogates) to define Hillary Clinton as similarly corrupt. He
is running the same equivalency game on Joe Biden, but in this instance
(because of his own accrued liabilities) he specifically needs to undermine
Biden’s timeworn reputation as a faithful steward of American interests in the
realm of foreign policy.
To that end, the campaign to induce
a “China crisis” is
unspooling in tandem with a persistent message tying Joseph Biden and his son
Hunter to corrupt dealings with the leaders in Beijing. The first hints that this was in the
works appeared in October 2019, when (in the early stages of the impeachment
inquiry launched by the House of Representatives) Trump told news cameras that
not only should Hunter Biden’s dealings in Ukraine be scrutinized, but that his
activities in China, if investigated, would prove to be “even worse.”
The substance of these allegations
remains hazy, but they have been churning through the right-wing media
ecosystem for some time. Peter Schweizer, the author of the 2015 exposé Clinton Cash, has outlined charges
against Hunter in his more recent publication: Secret Empires: How the American Political Class Hides Corruption and
Enriches Family and Friends (Harper 2019). What can be clearly ascertained
is that Hunter Biden and his partners in a private equity firm set up an
investment fund, Bohai Harvest RST (or BHR), that relied in part on capital
provided by the Bank of China. The fund was set up after Hunter (and his
daughter Finnegan, Joe Biden’s granddaughter) accompanied Joe Biden (then still
Vice President) on a state visit to China in 2013.
The details of this business
venture are not fully known. How much money Hunter acquired from the Bank of
China, what his personal profit was from BHR’s investments, and what role Joe
Biden played (if any) in brokering this deal on behalf of Hunter and his
partners remain open questions. Certainly, there is at least an apparent
conflict of interest. But no one has produced evidence that either Hunter or Joe
Biden did anything illegal, or evenly blatantly unethical.
Lack of specifics has not deterred
Trump from pressing ahead with maximalist allegations. In a recent press
appearance Trump warned that, “If I don’t win the election, China will own the United States. You’re going to have
to learn Chinese, you want to know the truth.” This was only one in a long
series of dark hints at Joe Biden’s depth of cooptation by Beijing, a messaging strategy that is sure to
intensify in frequency and stridency as November 3 approaches.
Where is all this going? Thus far
the “China
crisis” campaign has achieved little traction. Neither the CCP leadership in Beijing nor the Biden team
have shown any inclination to take the bait. Biden has not been moved to offer
more than standard arguments in defense of his foreign policy credentials.
Even more remarkably, Beijing has been
extraordinarily restrained in its response to Trump’s provocations. The White
House, for example, seems to have expected that its closure of the Chinese
consulate in Houston
would produce a response much more amenable to cable TV fireworks. If Beijing had been more obliging, it would have closed the US consular office in Hong
Kong, a move that would have set off a media frenzy lasting days
or even weeks. Instead Beijing closed the US consulate in Chengdu, a city that many American citizens
could not find on a map, guaranteeing that the “consulate confrontation” would
not provide fodder for more than a single news cycle. Similarly the proposed
bans on TikTok and WeChat have elicited little by way of visible retaliation. Beijing understands what
the Trump team is up to, and seems resolved not to play along.
If the Trump campaign understands
the situation, there is yet no sign that their determination to follow through
on the “China
crisis” plan has wavered. An incumbent president who refuses to be constrained
by any of the norms of foreign policy or constitutional good order has many
means at his disposal, and Trump can be counted on to use them all. Beijing has
vulnerabilities that can be exploited, and the White House has already shown
that they are aware of these.
In particular, the trip by HHS Secretary
Azar to Taiwan was an
escalation into Beijing’s
“red zone” of threat sensitivity. For four decades, successive US administrations have cleaved to a policy of
“strategic ambiguity” calibrated to keep the peace in the Taiwan
Strait. On the one hand, our posture seeks to persuade Beijing that any unprovoked military strike against Taiwan will be met with stiff resistance from
the US,
up to and including the use of military force. On the other hand, we have
deliberately kept leaders in Taipei guessing as
to how far our commitment to defend Taiwan
extends, to preclude them rashly provoking the wrath of Beijing.
Such a delicate game is
necessitated by the extreme volatility of the political situation in the
Strait. Chinese nationalists (that is, the vast majority of the PRC’s citizens)
view the inclusion of Taiwan
within China’s
sovereign territory as sacrosanct (even if that status is purely symbolic, as
is currently the case). No Chinese government, even one that had been
democratically elected, could survive the firestorm of civil unrest that would
ensue in the wake of a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence. At the
same time, most residents of Taiwan
feel little emotional investment in the prospects of unification with the PRC.
Indeed, sentiment in favor of formally declaring Taiwan an independent, democratic
republic has steadily grown in recent years, a move that would certainly entail
war.
The situation is explosive, and has
only remained stable through the prudence and forbearance of all major
international players. Enter Donald Trump, a figure for whom “prudence” and
“forbearance” might as well be words exclusively spoken in some
extraterrestrial tongue. He learned just how sensitive Beijing is on this issue
when, before being sworn in in January 2017, he tweeted about his pleasure at
receiving a phone call from “the president of Taiwan (Tsai Ing-wen),” drawing
immediate and apoplectic condemnation from PRC leaders.
If Trump wants to elicit a
belligerent response from Beijing (and he
clearly does), he knows he only has to press against the open nerve of Taiwan. The
trip by HHS Secretary Azar to Taipei
is only the first foray into this tactical field. As November 3 draws nigh, the
Trump White House will flirt ever more openly and perilously with recognition
of Taiwanese sovereignty, until they induce a response from Beijing that rises to the level of crisis
they desire.
By the same token, amplifying
“awareness” of the Bidens’ corrupt ties to China is a simple matter for any
president who has the will and the means to manipulate the powers of the
Executive. That Trump himself is game for any degree of abuse of power is
beyond doubt, and in Attorney General William Barr he clearly has a pliable
instrument for the purpose of exploiting the offices of the Justice Department.
As the “China crisis” heats up in late September or October, so too will a new
chapter unfold in federal law enforcement’s interests in the activities of
Hunter Biden and BHR. There is some slight possibility that we will get as far
as October 31 without seeing Hunter’s house searched under the auspices of a
“no-knock warrant” and Hunter himself “perp-walked” in handcuffs and under FBI
escort, but it would be shocking if that date comes without at least the
announcement of a “formal inquiry” into BHR’s alleged crimes by the Office of
the Attorney General.
Nothing
about Trump’s “China
crisis” charade should come as a surprise to anyone who has been paying
attention to his methods since the summer of 2015. He operates exclusively at a
level of public perception that he feels confident he can control, without any
regard for underlying realities or long-term consequences. Unfortunately for
the US,
the PRC, and the world at large, the Sino-American relationship on which he is
day trading is profoundly important to the long term stability and prosperity
of the global community. Hopefully, in the wake of the 2020 election, the
conduct of Chinese-American relations can be put back on a basis that is not
purely reducible to sound-bite politics of the moment.