In yesterday's New York Times, Thomas Friedman offered a column entitled "Syria is Iraq." In it, he notes that "Syria is Iraq’s twin — a multisectarian, minority-ruled dictatorship
that was held together by an iron fist under Baathist ideology." He therefore predicts that a "decent outcome" is unlikely in Syria in the absence of "a well-armed external midwife, whom everyone on the ground both fears and trusts to manage the transition." In other words, Syria is doomed to perpetual anarchy and civil war, because unlike Iraq, Syria will not enjoy the benefits of being invaded by the United States.
Friedman is not arguing for a U.S. invasion of Syria. He concedes that "Iraq was such a bitter experience for America" (as opposed to the Iraqis themselves, for whom the U.S. invasion was presumably a holiday) that invading Syria is unthinkable. It is difficult to fathom the practical point of Friedman's piece. Having conceded that "what is necessary...is impossible," Friedman notes that "in the Middle East, the alternative to bad is not always good. It can be worse." His conclusion would thus seem to be that since the U.S. can not do what is necessary in Syria, it should do nothing at all.
What intrigues me most about Friedman's column is the way it epitomizes much conventional American thinking, not only about the Middle East, but about the world at large. "Decent outcomes" can only come from the application of U.S. power. Where American might is ineffective, only pessimism and fatalism are warranted.
In his fit of paternalism, Friedman has forgotten one colossal difference between Syria and Iraq. The movement to displace the Assad regime, unlike the ouster of Saddam Hussein, is an organic, indigenous impulse of Syrian society. That fact alone may create resources and possibilities that were curtailed in the case of Iraq. If the Hussein regime had fallen to a home-grown uprising rather than succumbing to a sudden power vacuum caused by foreign invasion, perhaps in the process alternative power structures could have been built and new social compacts negotiated, precluding the "need" for a nine-year occupation. Perhaps the outcome in that case might have been a good sight more decent than the strife-torn country Iraq is today.
What is happening right now in Syria is of course very tragic, but it is potentially very hopeful in the long term. If the Syrian rebels manage to oust the Assad regime, it will be a major victory for people's revolution over the forces of modern military technology and entrenched totalitarianism. The very fact that the Syrian people have sustained their armed revolution for seventeen months in the face of murderous violence demonstrates that they have more courage, resourcefulness, and political will than Thomas Friedman gives them credit for.
A good outcome may be long in coming, and perhaps Friedman's darkest predictions will bear out in truth. But if the Syrian people do fight through to a better day, perhaps we can finally put aside delusions of American "midwifery" and come to a new assessment of the limits and potential of U.S. power. In the meantime, though the ultimate fate of Syria depends on the Syrian people themselves, it would be unwise of any nation to stand by and spectate as Syria bleeds. It is arrogant to assume that the Syrian people require a U.S. invasion to build a new future, but it is foolish to assume that any revolutionary movement facing such stacked odds can win through without assistance. If a new day does dawn in Syria, its people will remember who aided them and who stood idly by.
Thursday, July 26, 2012
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
The Rectification of Names
On July 10th, the New York Times published an editorial by Jiang Qing and Daniel Bell entitled "A Confucian Constitution for China." It argues that a Confucian "Way of the Humane Authority" is more suited to the needs of China than either authoritarianism or democracy. The essay has provoked much response, in both English and Chinese. I do not intend to parse through the individual points of Jiang's and Bell's proposal, as that has been done ably by several commentators. As Perry Link observed in a brief response published by the Times on July 13, the chief failing of the essay is its claim to develop a genuine "third way" for China. Though Jiang and Bell demonstrate clearly how their system differs from democracy, which they deem "flawed in practice," they do little to distinguish it from China's current system of authoritarian rule or to explain how it would better serve the Chinese people than the current regime.
Indeed, the only thing to recommend the constitution outlined by Jiang and Bell is its purported "Confucianism." For those of us engaged in the academic study of Chinese culture here in the U.S., such a public exercise in Orientalism is disheartening. The tendency to fetishize aspects of China's venerable culture has always been strong, but one hopes that over time it will be ameliorated by education and expanding awareness.
Progress has obviously been slow, however. As one colleague pointed out in an online forum, a close historical analog for the Times' proposal can be found in the case of Frank Johnson Goodnow, an American scholar who urged the first president of the Chinese Republic, Yuan Shikai, to dismantle the republic and declare himself emperor. Goodnow, like Bell and Jiang, argued that democracy was ill-suited to Chinese culture, and that the Chinese people needed the succor of their traditional institutions. Yuan (who from the outset was an erstwhile Republican) happily took Goodnow's advice, and the result was disaster: China was plunged into a decade-long "warlord period" marked by suffering and destruction. This kind of romanticization of Chinese tradition is rare in the academy today, but it obviously continues to inflect the attitudes and judgment of many cultural leaders here in the U.S.
My own sorrow at this incident is heightened by the fact that, in one respect, I agree with Jiang and Bell. Like them I believe that Confucian tradition will be very influential in the future political evolution of China, and I am convinced that the rich legacy of Confucianism has much to teach thinkers, leaders, and artists of all kinds throughout the world. In that respect, however, the essay in question has done more harm than good. However many romantic notions about Chinese tradition they might hold, Times readers generally know a silly idea when they see one. If this is their only exposure to Confucian thinking on current problems, they can not come away with the impression that Confucianism has much of value to contribute to today's discourse. This is an unfortunate misperception, and necessitates the Confucian practice of "the rectification names." All its readers should be aware that not only is Jiang's and Bell's proposal not very practical, it is not particularly Confucian either. Do not judge the entire Confucian tradition on the basis of this one use of its symbols and rhetoric.
Indeed, the only thing to recommend the constitution outlined by Jiang and Bell is its purported "Confucianism." For those of us engaged in the academic study of Chinese culture here in the U.S., such a public exercise in Orientalism is disheartening. The tendency to fetishize aspects of China's venerable culture has always been strong, but one hopes that over time it will be ameliorated by education and expanding awareness.
Progress has obviously been slow, however. As one colleague pointed out in an online forum, a close historical analog for the Times' proposal can be found in the case of Frank Johnson Goodnow, an American scholar who urged the first president of the Chinese Republic, Yuan Shikai, to dismantle the republic and declare himself emperor. Goodnow, like Bell and Jiang, argued that democracy was ill-suited to Chinese culture, and that the Chinese people needed the succor of their traditional institutions. Yuan (who from the outset was an erstwhile Republican) happily took Goodnow's advice, and the result was disaster: China was plunged into a decade-long "warlord period" marked by suffering and destruction. This kind of romanticization of Chinese tradition is rare in the academy today, but it obviously continues to inflect the attitudes and judgment of many cultural leaders here in the U.S.
My own sorrow at this incident is heightened by the fact that, in one respect, I agree with Jiang and Bell. Like them I believe that Confucian tradition will be very influential in the future political evolution of China, and I am convinced that the rich legacy of Confucianism has much to teach thinkers, leaders, and artists of all kinds throughout the world. In that respect, however, the essay in question has done more harm than good. However many romantic notions about Chinese tradition they might hold, Times readers generally know a silly idea when they see one. If this is their only exposure to Confucian thinking on current problems, they can not come away with the impression that Confucianism has much of value to contribute to today's discourse. This is an unfortunate misperception, and necessitates the Confucian practice of "the rectification names." All its readers should be aware that not only is Jiang's and Bell's proposal not very practical, it is not particularly Confucian either. Do not judge the entire Confucian tradition on the basis of this one use of its symbols and rhetoric.
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Letter to President Obama on Syria
Dear President Obama,
I write out of concern for the ongoing conflict in Syria. Your actions in Libya demonstrated that the United States can, in consort with our allies, effectively project armed force in support of our values and interests. The strategic situation in Syria is clearly very different, and your prudence up to this point has been well warranted by the circumstances. However, the crisis has become so dire that we are compelled to take action, despite the real risks.
The regime of Bashar al-Assad, with its recent indiscriminate massacre of civilians, has fallen back on the use of unrestrained terror as the last remaining bulwark of its sovereign power. Such a government has put itself beyond the reach of any genuinely political process, it is not an entity that can be engaged diplomatically. The only way to revive a political process in Syria and to restore effectiveness to diplomatic means is to aid the development of a robust military alternative to the Assad machine. It is thus imperative that the international community rally to support the Free Syrian Army with funding, training, and weapons, so that they may protect the Syrian populace and force the Assad regime to refrain from committing wholesale slaughter.
Arguments against such a policy are of course valid. We do not know the precise composition of the Free Syrian Army, and some of its members are no doubt hostile to the U.S. and Israel. Support of the Free Syrian Army would anger Russia and antagonize Iran. Such caveats are undermined by the dramatic nature of the current crisis, however. Little can be done to destabilize the situation further than it has already become, and there is nothing that can be done to ameliorate the crisis that will be accepted by either Russia or Iran.
This being an election year, any action you take will no doubt come under unfair criticism from your political opponents. I would urge you, however, to show the same strength of leadership in the case of Syria as you showed in Libya. If the Assad regime is able to reestablish itself through naked terror, the cause of the Arab Spring will be set back dramatically, a consequence that will rebound to the severe detriment of the U.S. and her allies. Audacious action is required to secure the progress that the people of Syria and the Arab world at large have fought so bravely to achieve.
I hope this message finds you well. Thank you for your attention on this matter.
Sincerely,
Andrew Meyer
I write out of concern for the ongoing conflict in Syria. Your actions in Libya demonstrated that the United States can, in consort with our allies, effectively project armed force in support of our values and interests. The strategic situation in Syria is clearly very different, and your prudence up to this point has been well warranted by the circumstances. However, the crisis has become so dire that we are compelled to take action, despite the real risks.
The regime of Bashar al-Assad, with its recent indiscriminate massacre of civilians, has fallen back on the use of unrestrained terror as the last remaining bulwark of its sovereign power. Such a government has put itself beyond the reach of any genuinely political process, it is not an entity that can be engaged diplomatically. The only way to revive a political process in Syria and to restore effectiveness to diplomatic means is to aid the development of a robust military alternative to the Assad machine. It is thus imperative that the international community rally to support the Free Syrian Army with funding, training, and weapons, so that they may protect the Syrian populace and force the Assad regime to refrain from committing wholesale slaughter.
Arguments against such a policy are of course valid. We do not know the precise composition of the Free Syrian Army, and some of its members are no doubt hostile to the U.S. and Israel. Support of the Free Syrian Army would anger Russia and antagonize Iran. Such caveats are undermined by the dramatic nature of the current crisis, however. Little can be done to destabilize the situation further than it has already become, and there is nothing that can be done to ameliorate the crisis that will be accepted by either Russia or Iran.
This being an election year, any action you take will no doubt come under unfair criticism from your political opponents. I would urge you, however, to show the same strength of leadership in the case of Syria as you showed in Libya. If the Assad regime is able to reestablish itself through naked terror, the cause of the Arab Spring will be set back dramatically, a consequence that will rebound to the severe detriment of the U.S. and her allies. Audacious action is required to secure the progress that the people of Syria and the Arab world at large have fought so bravely to achieve.
I hope this message finds you well. Thank you for your attention on this matter.
Sincerely,
Andrew Meyer
Thursday, April 05, 2012
Letter to SCOTUS on the Affordable Care Act
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
I write you as a citizen out of concern that you might overturn the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed by Congress and signed into law in 2010. This is the most significant piece of social legislation enacted by the federal government in my lifetime, and a great step forward in solving problems that have increasingly debilitated the health care system of our nation for many decades. It is devastating to think that such a significant achievement, executed with such thought and effort, is in peril of being dismantled by your high office. The political climate of the nation being what it is, such a decision handed down by your Court would derail health care reform for another generation, condemning millions of Americans to lack of basic care and millions more to suffering brought on by rising health care costs.
This prospect is made doubly painful by the fact that all challenges to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act rest on highly specious logic. In an economy where 10-15% of the price of all goods and services now represents the health care costs associated with production and distribution, it is fantastic to imagine that the Affordable Care Act falls outside of the purview of Congress' duly mandated authority to regulate commerce. While the search for a "limiting principle" that would constrain the powers arrogated to Congress by the enactment of an individual mandate is of course valid and prudent, such a limiting principle is self-evident if one examines the issue with an unbiased eye.
Opponents of the Affordable Care Act claim that if it stands, Congress will be able to compel the purchase of any commodity or service by appeal to the commerce clause. This is manifestly untrue, however. Health insurance is not fungible with almost any other form of purchasable commodity, in that health insurance is itself a form of currency for the consumption of goods and services. Because of the unique nature of the health care market, insurance (privately acquired or publicly funded) is the currency with which health care is purchased in virtually every industrialized country. By mandating that all Americans must be insured, Congress is effectively regulating and rationalizing the commercial marketplace, by mandating that citizens convert one form of currency into another form more suited to the efficient operation of the health care market.
Unless one can explain how broccoli or cell phones necessarily operate as currency within an existing market, it is difficult to imagine how Congress could justify a mandate to purchase those items on the precedent of the Affordable Care Act. One might object that a mandate to buy burial insurance would nonetheless be constitutional on this principle. Even if one conceded that the precedent of the Affordable Care Act made a burial insurance mandate "proper" under the commerce clause (and there are so many structural differences between the mortuary and health care markets that such a contention would hang from a slender thread), does anyone believe that as a matter of degree, such a mandate could be construed as equally "necessary" to the regulation of the marketplace?
Moreover, this mandate does not entail an unprecedented injunction to "positive action," because the health care market is one in which all Americans already participate. To mandate that citizens buy insurance is not equivalent to mandating that they must push an elderly person away from an oncoming bus or face sanction. Rather, if there is an imperative to positive action with which the health insurance mandate is analogous, it is an injunction that a diner must pay his or her check before exiting a restaurant on completion of a meal. Viewed in this correct light, the Affordable Care Act does not arrogate powers to Congress that it does not already possess.
Upon careful deliberation, I urge you to do what the integrity of our constitutional system demands by upholding the Affordable Care Act and securing its benefits for the citizens of the United States. I hope that this communication finds you well, and thank you for your attention on this matter.
Sincerely,
Andrew Meyer
I write you as a citizen out of concern that you might overturn the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed by Congress and signed into law in 2010. This is the most significant piece of social legislation enacted by the federal government in my lifetime, and a great step forward in solving problems that have increasingly debilitated the health care system of our nation for many decades. It is devastating to think that such a significant achievement, executed with such thought and effort, is in peril of being dismantled by your high office. The political climate of the nation being what it is, such a decision handed down by your Court would derail health care reform for another generation, condemning millions of Americans to lack of basic care and millions more to suffering brought on by rising health care costs.
This prospect is made doubly painful by the fact that all challenges to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act rest on highly specious logic. In an economy where 10-15% of the price of all goods and services now represents the health care costs associated with production and distribution, it is fantastic to imagine that the Affordable Care Act falls outside of the purview of Congress' duly mandated authority to regulate commerce. While the search for a "limiting principle" that would constrain the powers arrogated to Congress by the enactment of an individual mandate is of course valid and prudent, such a limiting principle is self-evident if one examines the issue with an unbiased eye.
Opponents of the Affordable Care Act claim that if it stands, Congress will be able to compel the purchase of any commodity or service by appeal to the commerce clause. This is manifestly untrue, however. Health insurance is not fungible with almost any other form of purchasable commodity, in that health insurance is itself a form of currency for the consumption of goods and services. Because of the unique nature of the health care market, insurance (privately acquired or publicly funded) is the currency with which health care is purchased in virtually every industrialized country. By mandating that all Americans must be insured, Congress is effectively regulating and rationalizing the commercial marketplace, by mandating that citizens convert one form of currency into another form more suited to the efficient operation of the health care market.
Unless one can explain how broccoli or cell phones necessarily operate as currency within an existing market, it is difficult to imagine how Congress could justify a mandate to purchase those items on the precedent of the Affordable Care Act. One might object that a mandate to buy burial insurance would nonetheless be constitutional on this principle. Even if one conceded that the precedent of the Affordable Care Act made a burial insurance mandate "proper" under the commerce clause (and there are so many structural differences between the mortuary and health care markets that such a contention would hang from a slender thread), does anyone believe that as a matter of degree, such a mandate could be construed as equally "necessary" to the regulation of the marketplace?
Moreover, this mandate does not entail an unprecedented injunction to "positive action," because the health care market is one in which all Americans already participate. To mandate that citizens buy insurance is not equivalent to mandating that they must push an elderly person away from an oncoming bus or face sanction. Rather, if there is an imperative to positive action with which the health insurance mandate is analogous, it is an injunction that a diner must pay his or her check before exiting a restaurant on completion of a meal. Viewed in this correct light, the Affordable Care Act does not arrogate powers to Congress that it does not already possess.
Upon careful deliberation, I urge you to do what the integrity of our constitutional system demands by upholding the Affordable Care Act and securing its benefits for the citizens of the United States. I hope that this communication finds you well, and thank you for your attention on this matter.
Sincerely,
Andrew Meyer
Sunday, March 11, 2012
Secular Chauvinism and the Triumph of False Cognates
This past week I gave a lecture to my students that almost certainly failed in its objective. The course was "Shaping of the Modern World," the topic was "Religion and Science, 1450-1750." I pleaded the case that the conventional story about religion and science in modern history should be held in suspicion. We are often inclined to think that as the world "modernized," science became more important in society and religion less so. I tried to persuade my students that the picture was more complicated, that the roles of religion and science in global society have both surely changed since 1450, but in complex ways that make facile quantitative comparisons of their relative influence specious.
Blue in the face as I may be, I suspect that I will receive many essays on our upcoming midterm which begin, "Since 1450, religion has become less important in world society as the influence of science has grown (for those of my students enterprising enough to find this blog-congratulations! you have a jump on the exam)." Much of the fault for this lies in my own weak powers as an instructor- I lack the personal charisma and clarity of expression required to create a "dissonance effect" that will shake my students out of a deeply entrenched paradigm. Part of the fault, however, lies in the depth to which the paradigm is entrenched, and the frequency and intensity with which it is reinforced by our popular culture and mass media.
The "religion : modernity as oil : water" fallacy is pervasive, as evidenced by the cottage industry of popular secular chauvinists such as Bill Maher. The bias to which it gives rise is insidious. Even people of faith are not immune: if only I had a dime for every devout Jew or Christian I have seen lament the inability of Islam to adapt to the modern world. This might all be amusing if it did not have serious consequences for our discourse and politics. Because so many are so ignorant and so dismissive of religion, we tend to collectively misunderstand many events and movements in which religion plays a central role.
The controversy over reproductive freedom is a central case in point. The past few years, statistics have shown that so-called "pro-life" opinions were becoming more widespread. Some polls seemed to show that a majority of Americans had become "pro-life." This impression was based on a misconception, however. Though many Americans object to legalized abortion for ethical and religious reasons, those reasons are so varied as to not truly be mutually fungible. This fact has been thrown into stark light by the recent controversy over contraception. As Gail Collins wrote yesterday in The New York Times, "[The] more we argue about contraception, the more people are going to notice that a great many of the folks who are opposed to abortion in general are also opposed to birth control." The perception that a "majority" of Americans had become "pro-life" hinged upon the ascendancy of a false cognate. Those who oppose abortion because they view a fetus as a person and those who oppose abortion because they feel that all aspects of sexual life should be controlled by God are both called "pro-life" by the media, but many in the former group have less in common with fellow "pro-lifers" than they do with large swaths of America that consider themselves "pro-choice."
Other regrettable instances may be seen in American perceptions of the Middle East. Followers of Osama bin-Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini are both "Islamists." Those who view Israel as a vestigial remnant of colonialism and those who view Israel as an impediment to the creation of a new caliphate are both "anti-Zionists." Conversely, those who would defend the "Green Line" and those who would annex "Judea and Samaria" are both simply "Zionists." All of these labels confuse forces and actors that are fundamentally incommensurate with one-another, and all these distortions materially degrade the effectiveness of our foreign policy.
As an ardent secularist, I would never argue that secular chauvinism is a greater problem for our society than religious chauvinism. No such biases come without a cost, however. Anyone who views religion with dismissive scorn does so at his or her peril. The role of religion in today's society is obviously different than that of 1450, but religion remains a robust, multidimensional, and dynamic presence in all corners of the globe and in all aspects of human affairs. Until the common misconception of religion's "decline" is put aside, we will continue to misunderstand the forces that are shaping the world around us, and fail to respond effectively to events that impact our daily lives.
Blue in the face as I may be, I suspect that I will receive many essays on our upcoming midterm which begin, "Since 1450, religion has become less important in world society as the influence of science has grown (for those of my students enterprising enough to find this blog-congratulations! you have a jump on the exam)." Much of the fault for this lies in my own weak powers as an instructor- I lack the personal charisma and clarity of expression required to create a "dissonance effect" that will shake my students out of a deeply entrenched paradigm. Part of the fault, however, lies in the depth to which the paradigm is entrenched, and the frequency and intensity with which it is reinforced by our popular culture and mass media.
The "religion : modernity as oil : water" fallacy is pervasive, as evidenced by the cottage industry of popular secular chauvinists such as Bill Maher. The bias to which it gives rise is insidious. Even people of faith are not immune: if only I had a dime for every devout Jew or Christian I have seen lament the inability of Islam to adapt to the modern world. This might all be amusing if it did not have serious consequences for our discourse and politics. Because so many are so ignorant and so dismissive of religion, we tend to collectively misunderstand many events and movements in which religion plays a central role.
The controversy over reproductive freedom is a central case in point. The past few years, statistics have shown that so-called "pro-life" opinions were becoming more widespread. Some polls seemed to show that a majority of Americans had become "pro-life." This impression was based on a misconception, however. Though many Americans object to legalized abortion for ethical and religious reasons, those reasons are so varied as to not truly be mutually fungible. This fact has been thrown into stark light by the recent controversy over contraception. As Gail Collins wrote yesterday in The New York Times, "[The] more we argue about contraception, the more people are going to notice that a great many of the folks who are opposed to abortion in general are also opposed to birth control." The perception that a "majority" of Americans had become "pro-life" hinged upon the ascendancy of a false cognate. Those who oppose abortion because they view a fetus as a person and those who oppose abortion because they feel that all aspects of sexual life should be controlled by God are both called "pro-life" by the media, but many in the former group have less in common with fellow "pro-lifers" than they do with large swaths of America that consider themselves "pro-choice."
Other regrettable instances may be seen in American perceptions of the Middle East. Followers of Osama bin-Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini are both "Islamists." Those who view Israel as a vestigial remnant of colonialism and those who view Israel as an impediment to the creation of a new caliphate are both "anti-Zionists." Conversely, those who would defend the "Green Line" and those who would annex "Judea and Samaria" are both simply "Zionists." All of these labels confuse forces and actors that are fundamentally incommensurate with one-another, and all these distortions materially degrade the effectiveness of our foreign policy.
As an ardent secularist, I would never argue that secular chauvinism is a greater problem for our society than religious chauvinism. No such biases come without a cost, however. Anyone who views religion with dismissive scorn does so at his or her peril. The role of religion in today's society is obviously different than that of 1450, but religion remains a robust, multidimensional, and dynamic presence in all corners of the globe and in all aspects of human affairs. Until the common misconception of religion's "decline" is put aside, we will continue to misunderstand the forces that are shaping the world around us, and fail to respond effectively to events that impact our daily lives.
Wednesday, February 08, 2012
Contraception, the Catholic Church, and the War on Religion Flim-Flam
Furor over the Department and Health and Human Service's ruling that Catholic agencies must offer employees health coverage granting access to contraception is the latest centerpiece of the conservative media's attempt to frame the Obama White House as waging a "war on religion." To hear pundits on the right, this regulation is the greatest assault on conscience since the Spanish Inquisition. The resulting cascade of incendiary rhetoric and ill logic has been painful to witness.
For all the sound and fury, I have yet to see anyone explain whose conscience the disputed regulation violates, or how. Yes, the policy almost certainly will result in the Church indirectly paying for such practices as the use of condoms, which its teachings forbid. But this is no more a violation of conscience than a pacifist's taxes paying for a military engaged in active warfare, or an orthodox Jew's taxes paying for mail carriers that work on the Sabbath. No social contract in a pluralistic society will ever perfectly accommodate the parochial commitments of all individuals.
Moreover, the use of contraception is a question of conscience, but the availability of contraception is not- it is a question of public health. The HHS regulation will not force a single individual to use contraception. Allowing the Catholic Church to inhibit access to contraception to the myriads its agencies employs (many of who are not Catholic), however, will most certainly contribute to the spread of AIDS, hepatitis, and a host of other diseases. Conservatives are fond of complaining that nine unelected judges should not be empowered to set public policy. How much less should that power reside in the hands of a small cabal of bishops and cardinals completely unaccountable to the electorate at large?
For all the sound and fury, I have yet to see anyone explain whose conscience the disputed regulation violates, or how. Yes, the policy almost certainly will result in the Church indirectly paying for such practices as the use of condoms, which its teachings forbid. But this is no more a violation of conscience than a pacifist's taxes paying for a military engaged in active warfare, or an orthodox Jew's taxes paying for mail carriers that work on the Sabbath. No social contract in a pluralistic society will ever perfectly accommodate the parochial commitments of all individuals.
Moreover, the use of contraception is a question of conscience, but the availability of contraception is not- it is a question of public health. The HHS regulation will not force a single individual to use contraception. Allowing the Catholic Church to inhibit access to contraception to the myriads its agencies employs (many of who are not Catholic), however, will most certainly contribute to the spread of AIDS, hepatitis, and a host of other diseases. Conservatives are fond of complaining that nine unelected judges should not be empowered to set public policy. How much less should that power reside in the hands of a small cabal of bishops and cardinals completely unaccountable to the electorate at large?
Wednesday, December 28, 2011
The Lessons of Ron Paul
The last few weeks have been a study in self-reproach, as revelations about Congressman Ron Paul's early newsletters pervade the airwaves and print media. I have never counted myself a Paul supporter, but I confess to being intrigued by his anti-war message and seemingly fearless integrity. I was only vaguely aware of Mr. Paul in 2008, but in this election cycle he had made, for me as for many others, an increasingly larger impression. Facebook has shown me friends and family who are ardent "Paulites." When some of my brightest students asked what I thought of his candidacy, I answered that I found some of his positions interesting but discounted the chances of someone who wanted to eliminate the Federal Reserve. I now feel remiss at having failed to tell them the truth, which is that Mr. Paul is political poison.
My culpability is compounded by the fact that there is no excuse for my ignorance. This information about Paul has been publicly available for years, and is only now being highlighted because he took the lead in polling in Iowa. My students asked particularly about the unfairness of the media's inattention to Paul's campaign, and I should have been able to tell them that such inattention was rather benign, that Paul would not look any better if more light was shown on his candidacy. Instead, I had allowed my own information about Paul to be shaped by the delivery mechanisms of the marketplace. I had been a passive consumer of knowledge that had been pre-packaged for me by newspapers and television producers, rather than going out to satisfy my own curiosity about this man and his past. It was a classic "do as I say and not as I do" scenario, for which I am heartily ashamed.
Paul has taught us all a valuable lesson about the difficult necessity of engaged citizenship. He has also offered us a snapshot of American political culture circa 2011. I do not pretend to know whether Mr. Paul personally holds the vile opinions that he allowed, year after year, to be published in his name. The trajectory of his career, however, demonstrates just how much traction such noxious ideologies still have in our society. The fact that Paul could not reach the political plateau at which he stands now without associating himself with racists and other bigots, and that even now he can not afford to effectively disassociate himself from them, stands testimony to the economic and political clout wielded by purveyors of hatred, intolerance, and paranoia in America today. If Barack Obama's election is a sign of how much social progress we have made as a nation, Ron Paul's candidacy is a sign of how much farther we have yet to go.
My culpability is compounded by the fact that there is no excuse for my ignorance. This information about Paul has been publicly available for years, and is only now being highlighted because he took the lead in polling in Iowa. My students asked particularly about the unfairness of the media's inattention to Paul's campaign, and I should have been able to tell them that such inattention was rather benign, that Paul would not look any better if more light was shown on his candidacy. Instead, I had allowed my own information about Paul to be shaped by the delivery mechanisms of the marketplace. I had been a passive consumer of knowledge that had been pre-packaged for me by newspapers and television producers, rather than going out to satisfy my own curiosity about this man and his past. It was a classic "do as I say and not as I do" scenario, for which I am heartily ashamed.
Paul has taught us all a valuable lesson about the difficult necessity of engaged citizenship. He has also offered us a snapshot of American political culture circa 2011. I do not pretend to know whether Mr. Paul personally holds the vile opinions that he allowed, year after year, to be published in his name. The trajectory of his career, however, demonstrates just how much traction such noxious ideologies still have in our society. The fact that Paul could not reach the political plateau at which he stands now without associating himself with racists and other bigots, and that even now he can not afford to effectively disassociate himself from them, stands testimony to the economic and political clout wielded by purveyors of hatred, intolerance, and paranoia in America today. If Barack Obama's election is a sign of how much social progress we have made as a nation, Ron Paul's candidacy is a sign of how much farther we have yet to go.
Sunday, December 11, 2011
The Invention of Newt Gingrich
Watching the GOP debate last night, it was frustrating to see Newt Gingrich's opponents stammer and fumble in search of a critique of his latest inflammatory rhetoric. If nothing else, the irony that Newt Gingrich, perhaps the American politician with the greatest gift for self-invention and reinvention, should judge the Palestinian people as "invented," is too rich to miss. It is perhaps too much to expect that a current GOP candidate could formulate an effective response in this context, however. All contenders last night were looking forward toward the general election, thus the polemical impotence of Newt's rivals on this score is an acknowledgment that he had stolen a march on them, finding just the right tone on this issue to score points with constituencies that will matter.
It is hard to know which possibility is worse in this case, that Newt's words were cynical or misguided. As a historian and a former professor, he surely knows that the question of whether (or when, or how) the "Palestinian people" were "invented" is entirely academic. "Palestine" is no more or less an invention than "Israel," arguments over which nation exists more "in essence" are hopelessly semantic. As I watched last night's debate, I waited in vain for someone to ask, "What exactly is your point, Newt? How does the 'inventedness' of the Palestinian people change the facts on the ground?"
The answer, of course, is that it does not. If the West Bank and Gaza were to be annexed by Israel today, it would no longer be a majority-Jewish state. At that point the Palestinian people, through the exercise of their franchise, would be free to invent whatever Palestine they would like, at the expense of Israel's very existence. Arguments over which nation is more organically "real" do not change that fact one iota. For Israel to remain true to its Zionist principles, a two-state solution must be effected.
No one on the dais last night in Iowa had the courage to call out Newt Gingrich on his bombast, perhaps sensing that the truth was a political loser for the GOP in the long term. President Obama is hurt by the widespread (though erroneous) perception that his support for a two-state solution makes him anti-Israeli. One can only hope, for the sake of both Israelis and Palestinians, that the current Gingrichian moment is not a harbinger of things to come.
It is hard to know which possibility is worse in this case, that Newt's words were cynical or misguided. As a historian and a former professor, he surely knows that the question of whether (or when, or how) the "Palestinian people" were "invented" is entirely academic. "Palestine" is no more or less an invention than "Israel," arguments over which nation exists more "in essence" are hopelessly semantic. As I watched last night's debate, I waited in vain for someone to ask, "What exactly is your point, Newt? How does the 'inventedness' of the Palestinian people change the facts on the ground?"
The answer, of course, is that it does not. If the West Bank and Gaza were to be annexed by Israel today, it would no longer be a majority-Jewish state. At that point the Palestinian people, through the exercise of their franchise, would be free to invent whatever Palestine they would like, at the expense of Israel's very existence. Arguments over which nation is more organically "real" do not change that fact one iota. For Israel to remain true to its Zionist principles, a two-state solution must be effected.
No one on the dais last night in Iowa had the courage to call out Newt Gingrich on his bombast, perhaps sensing that the truth was a political loser for the GOP in the long term. President Obama is hurt by the widespread (though erroneous) perception that his support for a two-state solution makes him anti-Israeli. One can only hope, for the sake of both Israelis and Palestinians, that the current Gingrichian moment is not a harbinger of things to come.
Friday, November 04, 2011
Iraq Through the Parallax View
Even before the last U.S. soldier has left Iraq, President Obama's order to withdraw forces is being filtered through distorting prisms on the left and right. In these opposed descriptions Iraq itself appears as if reflected in an array of funhouse mirrors, unrecognizable as a single nation from one account to the next. It would seem as if, whatever their ideological view, American observers are incapable of seeing Iraqi society as anything but a passive operand of U.S. power.
On the right, for example, Charles Krauthammer decries Obama's "unseriousness" in attempting to retain a mere five thousand soldiers in Iraq rather than the twenty thousand recommended by military commanders, demonstrating that "he simply wanted out." "Years from now," prognosticates Krauthammer, "we will be asking not 'Who lost Iraq?' — that already is clear — but 'Why?'"
The view from the left, though inverted, is weirdly symmetrical. Immanuel Wallerstein castigates the Obama administration for "trying as hard as they could to negotiate an agreement with the Iraqis that would override the one signed by President George W. Bush to withdraw all troops by Dec. 31, 2011." The fact that they failed in this attempt spells defeat for the U.S. and "a victory for Iraqi nationalism." "No one should be surprised," opines Wallerstein, "if, after the next Iraqi elections, the prime minister will be Muqtada al-Sadr."
The common fallacy of Krauthammer and Wallerstein resides in their shared rhetoric of American "victory" and "defeat." It should be clear to anyone who has looked critically at events in Iraq for the past eight years that the situation there was not America's to "win" or "lose." Since the fall of Saddam Huseein, Iraqi society has been evolving almost entirely under the impulses of its own people and culture. Views like those of Krauthammer and Wallerstein demonstrate a complete failure to view Iraq authentically and on its own terms.
Krauthammer's insistence that twenty thousand American troops will make the difference between triumph and disaster in Iraq is made most remarkable by his lack of interest in explaining the principles upon which this judgment is based. He seems to assume that the logic of his case is self-evident, but it is only so if one ignores any portion of Iraq's past in which the U.S. did not play a role (and some others in which it did). Krauthammer lambasts the Obama administration's inability, given three years, to "broker a centrist nationalist coalition" for Iraq's government, a failure that looms large unless it is compared to the failure of the Bush administration to accomplish the same task in five. He posits the "lost" twenty-thousand troops as an end unto themselves, declaring that Obama has missed "the opportunity to establish a lasting strategic alliance with the Arab world’s second most important power." But if garrisoning an Arab nation is of such vital strategic benefit, the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia prior to the invasion of Iraq arguably already fulfilled that role, much good that it did. In like fashion, Krauthammer complains that a continued U.S. presence is necessary to forestall growing Iranian influence. Not only does this ignore the historic tensions between Iraqis and Iranians, it overlooks the fact that if reducing Iranian influence in Iraq is the sine qua non of American victory, the U.S. could have won best by not invading Iraq in the first place, as Iranian influence was at its nadir under Saddam Hussein.
Wallerstein's view similarly ignores the particulars of Iraq's past and present. Though Iraq is not and has never been wholly dependent upon or malleable to U.S. power, Iraqis are not and have never been homogeneously and reflexively anti-American. To characterize a "victory for Iraqi nationalism" as synonymous with "U.S. defeat" is to adopt an absurdly reductionist and one-dimensional model of both nations. This is clearly illustrated by Wallerstein's "prediction" that Muqtada al-Sadr might become prime minister of Iraq. Al-Sadr has been a consistently anti-American force, it is true, but to believe that this makes him the poster child for Iraqi nationalism in all precincts of the Iraqi community is to completely misunderstand his role in Iraqi culture and society. There is no scenario in which Muqtada al-Sadr becomes prime minister of Iraq in which that nation is not plunged immediately into civil war.
The invasion of Iraq should provide no precedent for U.S. foreign policy moving forward. That will only be guaranteed, however, if Americans can break the habit of viewing foreign nations as driven entirely by the shifting dispositions of U.S. power and interests, and come to appreciate that each nation has its own history, culture, and particular political dynamic. This latter sort of perspective was expressed by one American observer in 2002, who warned "that even a successful war against Iraq will require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences." How true that proved to be.
On the right, for example, Charles Krauthammer decries Obama's "unseriousness" in attempting to retain a mere five thousand soldiers in Iraq rather than the twenty thousand recommended by military commanders, demonstrating that "he simply wanted out." "Years from now," prognosticates Krauthammer, "we will be asking not 'Who lost Iraq?' — that already is clear — but 'Why?'"
The view from the left, though inverted, is weirdly symmetrical. Immanuel Wallerstein castigates the Obama administration for "trying as hard as they could to negotiate an agreement with the Iraqis that would override the one signed by President George W. Bush to withdraw all troops by Dec. 31, 2011." The fact that they failed in this attempt spells defeat for the U.S. and "a victory for Iraqi nationalism." "No one should be surprised," opines Wallerstein, "if, after the next Iraqi elections, the prime minister will be Muqtada al-Sadr."
The common fallacy of Krauthammer and Wallerstein resides in their shared rhetoric of American "victory" and "defeat." It should be clear to anyone who has looked critically at events in Iraq for the past eight years that the situation there was not America's to "win" or "lose." Since the fall of Saddam Huseein, Iraqi society has been evolving almost entirely under the impulses of its own people and culture. Views like those of Krauthammer and Wallerstein demonstrate a complete failure to view Iraq authentically and on its own terms.
Krauthammer's insistence that twenty thousand American troops will make the difference between triumph and disaster in Iraq is made most remarkable by his lack of interest in explaining the principles upon which this judgment is based. He seems to assume that the logic of his case is self-evident, but it is only so if one ignores any portion of Iraq's past in which the U.S. did not play a role (and some others in which it did). Krauthammer lambasts the Obama administration's inability, given three years, to "broker a centrist nationalist coalition" for Iraq's government, a failure that looms large unless it is compared to the failure of the Bush administration to accomplish the same task in five. He posits the "lost" twenty-thousand troops as an end unto themselves, declaring that Obama has missed "the opportunity to establish a lasting strategic alliance with the Arab world’s second most important power." But if garrisoning an Arab nation is of such vital strategic benefit, the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia prior to the invasion of Iraq arguably already fulfilled that role, much good that it did. In like fashion, Krauthammer complains that a continued U.S. presence is necessary to forestall growing Iranian influence. Not only does this ignore the historic tensions between Iraqis and Iranians, it overlooks the fact that if reducing Iranian influence in Iraq is the sine qua non of American victory, the U.S. could have won best by not invading Iraq in the first place, as Iranian influence was at its nadir under Saddam Hussein.
Wallerstein's view similarly ignores the particulars of Iraq's past and present. Though Iraq is not and has never been wholly dependent upon or malleable to U.S. power, Iraqis are not and have never been homogeneously and reflexively anti-American. To characterize a "victory for Iraqi nationalism" as synonymous with "U.S. defeat" is to adopt an absurdly reductionist and one-dimensional model of both nations. This is clearly illustrated by Wallerstein's "prediction" that Muqtada al-Sadr might become prime minister of Iraq. Al-Sadr has been a consistently anti-American force, it is true, but to believe that this makes him the poster child for Iraqi nationalism in all precincts of the Iraqi community is to completely misunderstand his role in Iraqi culture and society. There is no scenario in which Muqtada al-Sadr becomes prime minister of Iraq in which that nation is not plunged immediately into civil war.
The invasion of Iraq should provide no precedent for U.S. foreign policy moving forward. That will only be guaranteed, however, if Americans can break the habit of viewing foreign nations as driven entirely by the shifting dispositions of U.S. power and interests, and come to appreciate that each nation has its own history, culture, and particular political dynamic. This latter sort of perspective was expressed by one American observer in 2002, who warned "that even a successful war against Iraq will require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences." How true that proved to be.
Thursday, October 27, 2011
Occupy the Ballot Box
I have many excuses for failing to appear at Zuccotti Park. Work and family preoccupy my time. Well into middle age, I simply do not feel hip enough to join the drum circle. Rank laziness is, if I am completely honest, a factor.
My guilt at this lapse is genuine. As income disparity grows, the relentlessly widening chasm between the wealthiest segment of our society and everyone else threatens the very foundation of our Republic. The issues being raised by the OWS protesters are vitally urgent, the crisis of this generation. Yet, all excuses aside, my aloofness reflects a genuine ambivalence.
I can not summon a robust motivation to join the protests because I am hounded by a persistent question: how many of the protesters voted in the last election? This is, I know, a heavily freighted question. The old adage warning us not to assume is well taken, and I might well be surprised by the empirical answer to my query. But I can not shake the doubts my question raises.
If many of the constituencies popularly associated with OWS (I am thinking especially of the young) had showed up at the ballot box in 2010 in the same numbers as 2008, our political landscape would be radically different right now. Real progress would have been made on some of the issues most central to the OWS protest- the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans would almost certainly already have been repealed, giving us a start toward redressing the crisis of income inequality.
In that climate, if a Democratically-controlled Congress continued to show reticence to address the concerns of the 99%, a broad-based popular movement like the one we are seeing now could have exerted real pressure to influence the legislative agenda. Alternatively, if the OWS protests had begun before the 2010 race, perhaps they could have mobilized groups that were absent from that electoral contest. It is in this respect of timing that the OWS movement is most distinct from the Tea Party. Though both groups are motivated by similar senses of anger and disaffection, the Tea Party translated that political energy into real effects at the ballot box.
At the moment, it is difficult to imagine OWS having that kind of impact. The Republican House will not be moved one iota from its commitment to obstructionism. Until the legislative logjam is broken, little can be accomplished by way of redressing the widening inequalities of American society. With every passing electoral cycle, the problem becomes more intractable. As wealth shifts ever-upward, the forces of regression acquire new power to entrench and institutionalize the dysfunctional status quo.
The way back from this precipice, however, can not be found in the complete absence of our established political institutions. Money may have corrupted politics to an unprecedented degree, but government action remains the greatest lever for change. The passion and cause of the OWS protesters are admirable, but their means will not attain their goals unless and until they can be translated into electoral impact. All depends on the vote.
My guilt at this lapse is genuine. As income disparity grows, the relentlessly widening chasm between the wealthiest segment of our society and everyone else threatens the very foundation of our Republic. The issues being raised by the OWS protesters are vitally urgent, the crisis of this generation. Yet, all excuses aside, my aloofness reflects a genuine ambivalence.
I can not summon a robust motivation to join the protests because I am hounded by a persistent question: how many of the protesters voted in the last election? This is, I know, a heavily freighted question. The old adage warning us not to assume is well taken, and I might well be surprised by the empirical answer to my query. But I can not shake the doubts my question raises.
If many of the constituencies popularly associated with OWS (I am thinking especially of the young) had showed up at the ballot box in 2010 in the same numbers as 2008, our political landscape would be radically different right now. Real progress would have been made on some of the issues most central to the OWS protest- the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans would almost certainly already have been repealed, giving us a start toward redressing the crisis of income inequality.
In that climate, if a Democratically-controlled Congress continued to show reticence to address the concerns of the 99%, a broad-based popular movement like the one we are seeing now could have exerted real pressure to influence the legislative agenda. Alternatively, if the OWS protests had begun before the 2010 race, perhaps they could have mobilized groups that were absent from that electoral contest. It is in this respect of timing that the OWS movement is most distinct from the Tea Party. Though both groups are motivated by similar senses of anger and disaffection, the Tea Party translated that political energy into real effects at the ballot box.
At the moment, it is difficult to imagine OWS having that kind of impact. The Republican House will not be moved one iota from its commitment to obstructionism. Until the legislative logjam is broken, little can be accomplished by way of redressing the widening inequalities of American society. With every passing electoral cycle, the problem becomes more intractable. As wealth shifts ever-upward, the forces of regression acquire new power to entrench and institutionalize the dysfunctional status quo.
The way back from this precipice, however, can not be found in the complete absence of our established political institutions. Money may have corrupted politics to an unprecedented degree, but government action remains the greatest lever for change. The passion and cause of the OWS protesters are admirable, but their means will not attain their goals unless and until they can be translated into electoral impact. All depends on the vote.
Saturday, October 22, 2011
The End of the Iraq War
President Obama's announcement of a total troop withdrawal from Iraq by the end of this year is a watershed moment in U.S. foreign policy, and one that should be applauded. Those critics, mainly in the GOP, who excoriate the President for "prematurely" disengaging from Iraq demonstrate their fundamental incomprehension of the situation. This moment is one toward which the U.S. has been heading ever since the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, and it is transpiring under circumstances more optimistic than those for which I and many other opponents of this war had dared to hope. The assertion that this withdrawal may confidently and definitively be deemed "too early" is based on the same kinds of flawed premises that led to the ill-conceived invasion from the outset.
Critics of the withdrawal are not wrong to hope that Iraq will remain relatively stable, peaceful, and prosperous. However misguided our initial invasion of Iraq may have been, since the defeat of Saddam Hussien our soldiers have been fighting and dying to secure the Iraqi people a future free from violence and terror, and it would be a tragic squandering of their sacrifice if Iraq slips back into civil war and anarchy. It is delusional, however, given the experience of the last nine years, to imagine that the long-term stability and prosperity of Iraq hinges on any actions by the United States right now. Since the first tanks rolled across the border in 2003, Iraq has served as an object lesson in the limits of U.S. power. Though America had the might to bring a swift end to the Hussein regime, from that point on it lost control of the situation. Iraqis, representing various constituencies, under varying degrees of pressure and influence from the U.S., have been driving events in Iraq for most of the nine years leading up to President Obama's withdrawal declaration. The removal of our last military personnel brings our strategic influence down to a new nadir, but this is a change to the situation in degree, not in kind.
Those pundits and gurus who declare that the failure to leave 5,000 trainers in Iraq is a disastrous mistake betray either cynicism or ignorance. After nine years of blood and struggle, Iraq remains a conflicted society whose state rests on a tenuous foundation. Perhaps the retention of 5,000 U.S. soldiers could spell the difference between continued stability and a slide into chaos, perhaps not. There is no real way to know. This last fact is not an argument for the ill wisdom of President Obama's order to withdraw. It is proof that the invasion of Iraq should never have been undertaken in the first place.
Critics of the withdrawal are not wrong to hope that Iraq will remain relatively stable, peaceful, and prosperous. However misguided our initial invasion of Iraq may have been, since the defeat of Saddam Hussien our soldiers have been fighting and dying to secure the Iraqi people a future free from violence and terror, and it would be a tragic squandering of their sacrifice if Iraq slips back into civil war and anarchy. It is delusional, however, given the experience of the last nine years, to imagine that the long-term stability and prosperity of Iraq hinges on any actions by the United States right now. Since the first tanks rolled across the border in 2003, Iraq has served as an object lesson in the limits of U.S. power. Though America had the might to bring a swift end to the Hussein regime, from that point on it lost control of the situation. Iraqis, representing various constituencies, under varying degrees of pressure and influence from the U.S., have been driving events in Iraq for most of the nine years leading up to President Obama's withdrawal declaration. The removal of our last military personnel brings our strategic influence down to a new nadir, but this is a change to the situation in degree, not in kind.
Those pundits and gurus who declare that the failure to leave 5,000 trainers in Iraq is a disastrous mistake betray either cynicism or ignorance. After nine years of blood and struggle, Iraq remains a conflicted society whose state rests on a tenuous foundation. Perhaps the retention of 5,000 U.S. soldiers could spell the difference between continued stability and a slide into chaos, perhaps not. There is no real way to know. This last fact is not an argument for the ill wisdom of President Obama's order to withdraw. It is proof that the invasion of Iraq should never have been undertaken in the first place.
Thursday, October 20, 2011
The Obama Doctrine
Even as today's news of the demise of Muammar Gaddafi inspires admiration for the courage and sacrifice of the Libyan people, it is not inappropriate to ask what lessons it holds for U.S. foreign policy. The contrast between U.S. actions in Iraq and Libya is quite stark. In both cases similar outcomes resulted, despite immeasurably greater losses of blood and treasure in Iraq. Perhaps now the theories of neoconservatism, that "unchallenged" U.S. power can remake the world according to America's preferences, may finally be put to rest. In its place Libya has given us an Obama Doctrine, the tenets of which may be listed as follows:
1. U.S power may be applied in foreign nations to assist trends that serve American interests and embody American values, only when those trends originate and have a substantial and organic basis of support in the nation where the operation will take place.
2. U.S. power should ideally be applied only when it is most urgently needed, to avert a major crisis or catastrophe.
3. U.S. power should be applied with the lightest possible footprint.
4. U.S. power should never be applied unilaterally, but in concert with the broadest and most capable coalition of allies possible.
The U.S. could do far worse than to embrace this Obama Doctrine moving forward. If it had been followed in places like Rwanda and Darfur, events might have transpired differently. In future, the more nearly U.S. foreign interventions approximate the ideals of the Obama Doctrine, the more likely outcomes will resemble those of Libya rather than Iraq.
1. U.S power may be applied in foreign nations to assist trends that serve American interests and embody American values, only when those trends originate and have a substantial and organic basis of support in the nation where the operation will take place.
2. U.S. power should ideally be applied only when it is most urgently needed, to avert a major crisis or catastrophe.
3. U.S. power should be applied with the lightest possible footprint.
4. U.S. power should never be applied unilaterally, but in concert with the broadest and most capable coalition of allies possible.
The U.S. could do far worse than to embrace this Obama Doctrine moving forward. If it had been followed in places like Rwanda and Darfur, events might have transpired differently. In future, the more nearly U.S. foreign interventions approximate the ideals of the Obama Doctrine, the more likely outcomes will resemble those of Libya rather than Iraq.
Tuesday, October 18, 2011
A Zionist Appraisal of the Release of Gilad Shalit
The release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for more than 1,000 Palestinian detainees has elicited much comment around the world. Many are critical of the terms of Shalit's return, noting that among those Palestinians being released are Hamas operatives and others guilty off horrendous crimes. As a Zionist, I cannot share in the condemnation of this exchange. Though I abhor what I view as the Netanyahu government's criminally negligent obstruction of a two-state solution, I would insist that in this instance they have acted as any other Israeli regime would have done, in accordance with the best principles upon which the Israeli state was founded.
If this exchange were likely to provide incentive for Hamas to abduct more Israelis, criticism might be more warranted, but it is not. Hamas did not capture Shalit with the main goal of freeing jailed Palestinians. They killed four of Gilad Shalit's comrades and took him captive in order to undermine Ariel Sharon's attempt to unilaterally disengage from the Palestinian Authority, which would have thwarted Hamas' aspirations for a "one-state solution." In the wake of Shalit's capture the Israelis re-occupied Gaza, killing many Hamas operatives and capturing many others, more than offsetting any "gains" Hamas has realized from the current prisoner exchange. In the face of those facts, the only arguments to be made against the exchange are the security threat posed by released Palestinian detainees and the propaganda value of a Hamas "victory" in this instance, but both these considerations are displaced by the larger principle embodied in the Israeli government's actions.
The Jewish state exists to defend the dignity and humanity of Jewish life in the face of powerful and enduring threats. On the basis of this urgent imperative, Israel demands a Herculean sacrifice of military service from all its citizens, but is also obligated to requite them with absolute commitment and support. Other governments have given Jews numbers, set them to work, and expected them to die. For the Israeli government to treat Gilad Shalit in such a fashion would be to betray the animating spirit of the Zionist movement. Israel calls on all its men and women to live in death's shadow, but in return it promises to move Heaven and Earth to bring them home alive after the completion of their duty, or, failing that, to see that their remains are properly interred rather than being cast into an oven or a mass grave.
Was the cost to bring Gilad Shalit home high? Yes. Was it right to pay that cost? Yes.
Welcome home, Gilad.
If this exchange were likely to provide incentive for Hamas to abduct more Israelis, criticism might be more warranted, but it is not. Hamas did not capture Shalit with the main goal of freeing jailed Palestinians. They killed four of Gilad Shalit's comrades and took him captive in order to undermine Ariel Sharon's attempt to unilaterally disengage from the Palestinian Authority, which would have thwarted Hamas' aspirations for a "one-state solution." In the wake of Shalit's capture the Israelis re-occupied Gaza, killing many Hamas operatives and capturing many others, more than offsetting any "gains" Hamas has realized from the current prisoner exchange. In the face of those facts, the only arguments to be made against the exchange are the security threat posed by released Palestinian detainees and the propaganda value of a Hamas "victory" in this instance, but both these considerations are displaced by the larger principle embodied in the Israeli government's actions.
The Jewish state exists to defend the dignity and humanity of Jewish life in the face of powerful and enduring threats. On the basis of this urgent imperative, Israel demands a Herculean sacrifice of military service from all its citizens, but is also obligated to requite them with absolute commitment and support. Other governments have given Jews numbers, set them to work, and expected them to die. For the Israeli government to treat Gilad Shalit in such a fashion would be to betray the animating spirit of the Zionist movement. Israel calls on all its men and women to live in death's shadow, but in return it promises to move Heaven and Earth to bring them home alive after the completion of their duty, or, failing that, to see that their remains are properly interred rather than being cast into an oven or a mass grave.
Was the cost to bring Gilad Shalit home high? Yes. Was it right to pay that cost? Yes.
Welcome home, Gilad.
Monday, October 03, 2011
The Clear Precedent for the Attack on Al-Awlaki
In the wake of the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, by U.S. forces in Yemen last Friday, some commentators have raised questions about the implications this attack has for civil liberties and due process in the United States. Critics express fear that this attack will radically expand presidential powers for use of military forces against U.S. citizens. Such doubts hinge on the assertion that this situation is unprecedented in U.S. military and legal history, however. It is not.
Anwar al-Awlaki is far from the first American citizen to go to war against the U.S. For example: during World War II, two Americans, Peter Delaney and Martin James Marti, served in the SS-Standarte Kurt Eggers, a Waffen-SS unit that specialized in propaganda aimed at Allied nations. Their role in the German military was thus remarkably similar to that performed by al-Awlaki in Al-Qaeda. Delaney was killed in action by Allied forces in 1945.
Senate Joint Resolution 23 of the 107th Congress authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001." As a result, the United States is effectively at war with Al-Qaeda as unequivocally as it was at war with Nazi Germany in 1945. U.S. forces thus had the same legal justification to target Anwar al-Awlaki as they did to target Peter Delaney during World War II.
If there is anything unprecedented about the current situation, it is not in the actions of the President or the military, but in the nature of Al-Qaeda itself as a combatant force. Peter Delaney formally invited U.S. hostility by donning the uniform of the Waffen-S.S. Al-Qaeda is a much more vaguely structured entity than the Nazi Party, the Wermacht, or the Greater German Reich, thus Anwar al-Awlaki's participation in Al-Qaeda did not generate the kind of formal, activating symbols that made Peter Delaney a target. If the enemy wears no uniform, how can we identify them? In al-Awlaki's case, we could take his word for it. He declared to the world repeatedly that he was a member of Al-Qaeda and that he shared its mission, thus there was no reason to doubt that he was at war with the United States of America.
The apprehension surrounding al-Awlaki's case is, in part, a product of unfortunate rhetoric that has marked U.S. foreign and military policy since 9/11. From the outset, many critics warned of the obscuring potential of a vaguely labeled "war on terror." The suspicions aroused by the death of al-Awlaki are just this type of consequence. Rhetoric should not blind us to what are evident facts and clear principles, however. Though a "war on terror" may be ill-conceived, a war on Al-Qaeda is just and necessary. In this context, our clearest guides to the identity of enemy combatants in the current struggle are the claims they themselves profess to make. We may never entirely understand why al-Awlaki joined Al-Qaeda, any more than we can understand the motives of Peter Delaney for joining the SS, but both men were equally at war with the United States of America, and suffered the same consequences.
Anwar al-Awlaki is far from the first American citizen to go to war against the U.S. For example: during World War II, two Americans, Peter Delaney and Martin James Marti, served in the SS-Standarte Kurt Eggers, a Waffen-SS unit that specialized in propaganda aimed at Allied nations. Their role in the German military was thus remarkably similar to that performed by al-Awlaki in Al-Qaeda. Delaney was killed in action by Allied forces in 1945.
Senate Joint Resolution 23 of the 107th Congress authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001." As a result, the United States is effectively at war with Al-Qaeda as unequivocally as it was at war with Nazi Germany in 1945. U.S. forces thus had the same legal justification to target Anwar al-Awlaki as they did to target Peter Delaney during World War II.
If there is anything unprecedented about the current situation, it is not in the actions of the President or the military, but in the nature of Al-Qaeda itself as a combatant force. Peter Delaney formally invited U.S. hostility by donning the uniform of the Waffen-S.S. Al-Qaeda is a much more vaguely structured entity than the Nazi Party, the Wermacht, or the Greater German Reich, thus Anwar al-Awlaki's participation in Al-Qaeda did not generate the kind of formal, activating symbols that made Peter Delaney a target. If the enemy wears no uniform, how can we identify them? In al-Awlaki's case, we could take his word for it. He declared to the world repeatedly that he was a member of Al-Qaeda and that he shared its mission, thus there was no reason to doubt that he was at war with the United States of America.
The apprehension surrounding al-Awlaki's case is, in part, a product of unfortunate rhetoric that has marked U.S. foreign and military policy since 9/11. From the outset, many critics warned of the obscuring potential of a vaguely labeled "war on terror." The suspicions aroused by the death of al-Awlaki are just this type of consequence. Rhetoric should not blind us to what are evident facts and clear principles, however. Though a "war on terror" may be ill-conceived, a war on Al-Qaeda is just and necessary. In this context, our clearest guides to the identity of enemy combatants in the current struggle are the claims they themselves profess to make. We may never entirely understand why al-Awlaki joined Al-Qaeda, any more than we can understand the motives of Peter Delaney for joining the SS, but both men were equally at war with the United States of America, and suffered the same consequences.
Thursday, September 01, 2011
Impressions of a Trip to China
Anyone who has traveled periodically to China over the past 25 years (as I have) will remark upon how rapidly and profoundly China has changed over that time. In my most recent trip (from which I returned yesterday), however, even I who have been acculturated to the extreme dynamism of the new China was amazed by how drastically it has changed in the eight years since I last visited. Prosperity has advanced in China to a degree that would have been difficult to imagine when I first set foot in Beijing in the winter of 1987.
The first inkling we had of this transformation was on our first full day in Beijing, on a visit to the Forbidden City. The site was overrun by a throng of tourists one would not encounter anywhere in the U.S., with the possible exception of Disneyland. These were people from all over China. In casual conversations we encountered families from Shandong, Shaanxi, and Fujian, and I am sure if we had taken the time we could have found someone from every province and autonomous region of the PRC. Even accounting for the summer season, the crowds of leisure travelers signified the rise of a new middle class that simply had not existed at any other time I had visited China in the past 25 years.
That new socioeconomic reality was made more dramatic on our excursion to Beijing's most famous roast duck restaurant, Quan Ju De. In 1987 I and my other college friends used to roll up to the door on our bicycles and be escorted promptly into the half-empty (and prohibitively expensive, from the perspective of most Chinese citizens) restaurant to dine next to party cadres. This time my family and I arrived at the front door to find a crowd of at least 150 people perched on small plastic stools, each clutching a number and waiting to hear it called over a megaphone by a hostess in a beautiful silk qipao. Such culinary democracy was unknown in the China I had seen in the past.
These were only two instances of the enormous rise and spread of prosperity that we encountered on this trip. To be sure, there was still real poverty, and the limits of the new prosperity could be observed. New buildings were under construction everywhere, but certain key resources were poorly maintained. In Chengdu my mother suffered a laceration that required stitches, and the trip to the emergency room of the local hospital was like a journey to 1988. Vast sums have been spent on assets that have a high international profile, such as the Chengdu airport (which is tripling in size), but Chengdu's hospitals do not seem to have benifited as significantly from these capital investments.
Even acknowledging these shortfalls, the rising tide of prosperity in China is astounding and impressive. I do not know the hard statistics, but I would be willing to bet that, in either absolute or proportional terms, the PRC government has overseen the largest expansion of wealth in human history. This fact has forced me to reassess my expectations regarding China's short-term future.
I have felt in the past, and continue to believe, that China's political system is in dire need of democratization and decentralization. Indeed, this trip was not without signs of political trouble. In the Forbidden City we saw a policeman carelessly scatter a poor peddlar's wares with his nightstick, and on the walk back to our hotel we encountered a battalion of police who had cordoned off a one-block perimeter around a disturbance and who refused either to let us pass or to answer questions about what was happening. Beyond this, in every city but Hong Kong to which we traveled we saw ubiquitous political slogans, which had been almost totally absent from the urban landscape eight years ago. Everywhere banners, billboards, and posters exorted citizens to be "civilized 文明" or praised "the unity of the party and the people." Such insistent propoganda smacks of political insecurity.
While this is true, and while I remain convinced of the need for real political change in China, my latest visit makes me less confident that it will come in short order. The impact of the sheer magnitude of wealth China has generated in the last twenty years is difficult to assess or anticipate. On the one hand, rising prosperity will most likely lead to rising expectations, which will produce agitation for change. On the other hand, the government's success in overseeing rapid economic expansion must contribute in some measure to its legitimacy, and might understandably make the populace reticent to disturb the status quo. In any case, what I observed on this visit convinces me of one basic truth: if its leaders and people can take the steps necessary to make the rising tide of prosperity ecologically and politically sustainable, the future belongs to China.
The first inkling we had of this transformation was on our first full day in Beijing, on a visit to the Forbidden City. The site was overrun by a throng of tourists one would not encounter anywhere in the U.S., with the possible exception of Disneyland. These were people from all over China. In casual conversations we encountered families from Shandong, Shaanxi, and Fujian, and I am sure if we had taken the time we could have found someone from every province and autonomous region of the PRC. Even accounting for the summer season, the crowds of leisure travelers signified the rise of a new middle class that simply had not existed at any other time I had visited China in the past 25 years.
That new socioeconomic reality was made more dramatic on our excursion to Beijing's most famous roast duck restaurant, Quan Ju De. In 1987 I and my other college friends used to roll up to the door on our bicycles and be escorted promptly into the half-empty (and prohibitively expensive, from the perspective of most Chinese citizens) restaurant to dine next to party cadres. This time my family and I arrived at the front door to find a crowd of at least 150 people perched on small plastic stools, each clutching a number and waiting to hear it called over a megaphone by a hostess in a beautiful silk qipao. Such culinary democracy was unknown in the China I had seen in the past.
These were only two instances of the enormous rise and spread of prosperity that we encountered on this trip. To be sure, there was still real poverty, and the limits of the new prosperity could be observed. New buildings were under construction everywhere, but certain key resources were poorly maintained. In Chengdu my mother suffered a laceration that required stitches, and the trip to the emergency room of the local hospital was like a journey to 1988. Vast sums have been spent on assets that have a high international profile, such as the Chengdu airport (which is tripling in size), but Chengdu's hospitals do not seem to have benifited as significantly from these capital investments.
Even acknowledging these shortfalls, the rising tide of prosperity in China is astounding and impressive. I do not know the hard statistics, but I would be willing to bet that, in either absolute or proportional terms, the PRC government has overseen the largest expansion of wealth in human history. This fact has forced me to reassess my expectations regarding China's short-term future.
I have felt in the past, and continue to believe, that China's political system is in dire need of democratization and decentralization. Indeed, this trip was not without signs of political trouble. In the Forbidden City we saw a policeman carelessly scatter a poor peddlar's wares with his nightstick, and on the walk back to our hotel we encountered a battalion of police who had cordoned off a one-block perimeter around a disturbance and who refused either to let us pass or to answer questions about what was happening. Beyond this, in every city but Hong Kong to which we traveled we saw ubiquitous political slogans, which had been almost totally absent from the urban landscape eight years ago. Everywhere banners, billboards, and posters exorted citizens to be "civilized 文明" or praised "the unity of the party and the people." Such insistent propoganda smacks of political insecurity.
While this is true, and while I remain convinced of the need for real political change in China, my latest visit makes me less confident that it will come in short order. The impact of the sheer magnitude of wealth China has generated in the last twenty years is difficult to assess or anticipate. On the one hand, rising prosperity will most likely lead to rising expectations, which will produce agitation for change. On the other hand, the government's success in overseeing rapid economic expansion must contribute in some measure to its legitimacy, and might understandably make the populace reticent to disturb the status quo. In any case, what I observed on this visit convinces me of one basic truth: if its leaders and people can take the steps necessary to make the rising tide of prosperity ecologically and politically sustainable, the future belongs to China.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Obama, Israel, and the Jews
President Obama's speech to the State Department last week has occasioned much heated debate in the American Jewish community. These arguments have centered chiefly on the President's unprecedented declaration that "the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states." Though it is true that this has been the tacit basis of negotiations for more than a decade, Obama is the first U.S. president to publicly endorse such a formula.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has added more heat than light to this situation, responding with a long tirade as to why Israel can not return to its pre-1967 boundaries. This was a deeply obfuscatory rhetorical strategy, one that I suspect, given the power of Mr. Netanyahu's intellect, was quite disingenuous. Netanyahu knows very well that the issue is not whether Israel can or should return to its pre-1967 boundaries, but whether those should serve as the conceptual basis for a new Palestinian state. All negotiations in recent years have assumed that many Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank will remain within Israel; the adoption of the 1967 boundary as a benchmark only establishes the principle that a future Palestinian state must be compensated for such Israeli annexations by the transfer of equivalent uninhabited lands to Palestinian sovereignty.
The "indefensibility" of the 1967 boundaries was a well-worn shibboleth invoked by Netanyahu in response to Obama's speech. This is a further deflection from the point of Obama's initiative, and willfully ignores the heart of his message. In the same speech Obama committed the U.S. to the proposition that the future Palestinian state must be constitutionally demilitarized, an acknowledgment that both states emerging from the two-state solution will be secure jointly or not at all. Israel will in effect have to stand surety for the safety of the future Palestinian state, leaving the defensive perimeter of Israel virtually unchanged in the wake of a two-state solution.
As a Jew and a Zionist, I hope my fellow Americans will correctly see the right side of this divide. What Obama has offered is a reasonable way forward, and what Netanyahu has offered is a truculent and tendentious defense of an unsustainable status quo. The timing of Obama's speech is, as many commentators have noted, far from arbitrary. The Palestinian Authority is planning to apply for UN recognition this fall, and such recognition will only be forestalled by a U.S. veto. Should that happen, both Israel and the U.S. will be cast into severe diplomatic isolation, and the path toward peace will become even more intractable. In the face of this contingency, President Obama's initiative is as wise as it is bold. For him to risk some of the political capital that he has accrued in the wake of Osama bin Laden's demise shows vision, leadership, and a sincere concern for the cause of Israel and peace. It would be a shame if the American Jewish community were to be taken in by the rhetorical attacks of Prime Minister Netanyahu. If that should happen, the greatest losers (after the Palestinians) would not be Obama or his party, but the Israelis themselves.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has added more heat than light to this situation, responding with a long tirade as to why Israel can not return to its pre-1967 boundaries. This was a deeply obfuscatory rhetorical strategy, one that I suspect, given the power of Mr. Netanyahu's intellect, was quite disingenuous. Netanyahu knows very well that the issue is not whether Israel can or should return to its pre-1967 boundaries, but whether those should serve as the conceptual basis for a new Palestinian state. All negotiations in recent years have assumed that many Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank will remain within Israel; the adoption of the 1967 boundary as a benchmark only establishes the principle that a future Palestinian state must be compensated for such Israeli annexations by the transfer of equivalent uninhabited lands to Palestinian sovereignty.
The "indefensibility" of the 1967 boundaries was a well-worn shibboleth invoked by Netanyahu in response to Obama's speech. This is a further deflection from the point of Obama's initiative, and willfully ignores the heart of his message. In the same speech Obama committed the U.S. to the proposition that the future Palestinian state must be constitutionally demilitarized, an acknowledgment that both states emerging from the two-state solution will be secure jointly or not at all. Israel will in effect have to stand surety for the safety of the future Palestinian state, leaving the defensive perimeter of Israel virtually unchanged in the wake of a two-state solution.
As a Jew and a Zionist, I hope my fellow Americans will correctly see the right side of this divide. What Obama has offered is a reasonable way forward, and what Netanyahu has offered is a truculent and tendentious defense of an unsustainable status quo. The timing of Obama's speech is, as many commentators have noted, far from arbitrary. The Palestinian Authority is planning to apply for UN recognition this fall, and such recognition will only be forestalled by a U.S. veto. Should that happen, both Israel and the U.S. will be cast into severe diplomatic isolation, and the path toward peace will become even more intractable. In the face of this contingency, President Obama's initiative is as wise as it is bold. For him to risk some of the political capital that he has accrued in the wake of Osama bin Laden's demise shows vision, leadership, and a sincere concern for the cause of Israel and peace. It would be a shame if the American Jewish community were to be taken in by the rhetorical attacks of Prime Minister Netanyahu. If that should happen, the greatest losers (after the Palestinians) would not be Obama or his party, but the Israelis themselves.
Monday, January 10, 2011
Tragedy in Arizona
I am heartbroken by the murder of so many innocents in Arizona, and in the midst of sorrow I have one regret which, with some trepidation, I feel moved to articulate. In December of 2008, Iraqi journalist Muntadhar al-Zaidi threw a shoe at President Bush during a press conference in Baghdad. Despite being deeply angry at Mr. Bush for what I felt was negligent leadership on his part, I was shocked and saddened to hear of the incident. The assault was an affront to the dignity of the United States, and exposed vulnerabilities in the President's security that might embolden would-be assassins. I did not, however, publicly express outrage or condemnation. I take little solace from the fact that I was not alone in this lapse.
The current tragedy throws my inattention at that time into sharp relief. It may seem grotesque to compare the somewhat farcical incident of 2008 to the terrible events now, but they do exemplify a common principle. Any assault, no matter how trivial, on the person of an American government official, is an assault upon the office he or she holds, and an attack on the nation that office embodies. For anyone of any political stripe who claims to love our country there can be no question of degree or area of gray on this score. Our democratic Republic can not long withstand the repetition of acts like that in Tucson. Either the persons of our elected and appointed officials are sacrosanct, or our Constitution is not worth the paper upon which it is written. Anyone who suggests, even rhetorically or in jest, any sort of physical trespass upon the person of any official of the United States government, is not a patriot, and should be given no attention whatsoever in serious discourse.
I realize that it is in bad taste to express an abstract principle on the occasion of what is a horrific personal tragedy for so many, but I hope I may be excused. My thoughts and condolences go out to all who have been affected by this heinous act. May God bless you and grant you strength to endure your grief.
The current tragedy throws my inattention at that time into sharp relief. It may seem grotesque to compare the somewhat farcical incident of 2008 to the terrible events now, but they do exemplify a common principle. Any assault, no matter how trivial, on the person of an American government official, is an assault upon the office he or she holds, and an attack on the nation that office embodies. For anyone of any political stripe who claims to love our country there can be no question of degree or area of gray on this score. Our democratic Republic can not long withstand the repetition of acts like that in Tucson. Either the persons of our elected and appointed officials are sacrosanct, or our Constitution is not worth the paper upon which it is written. Anyone who suggests, even rhetorically or in jest, any sort of physical trespass upon the person of any official of the United States government, is not a patriot, and should be given no attention whatsoever in serious discourse.
I realize that it is in bad taste to express an abstract principle on the occasion of what is a horrific personal tragedy for so many, but I hope I may be excused. My thoughts and condolences go out to all who have been affected by this heinous act. May God bless you and grant you strength to endure your grief.
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
A Note From Gen X to the Millenials
Dear Young Compatriots,
How I envy you. When I was in college, my comrades and I took to the barricades for Michael Dukakis. Ah, the heady days of youth. We were going to bring the Reagan Era to a screeching halt. Long story short, it did not turn out that way.
You, by contrast, have done what so many generations aspire to but few achieve. You have made revolution; you have made history! You more than any other part of our Republic brought about the presidency of Barack Obama. Bravo! On behalf of the nation I extend you thanks!
Since then you may have heard a lot of whingeing (mainly on the part of Baby Boomers) that Barack Obama is a big disappointment, that he has fallen short of expectations. Don't believe it! In my entire life before 2009 I was witness to a single piece of landmark, progressive social legislation- the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 (during the Nixon presidency). The excitement of that moment was lost on me at the time- I was three years old. The next 39 years were rather surreal, watching a government that seemed incapable of doing ANYTHING.
Against that backdrop, the last two years have been a shock. To see our government do so much- avert a depression, rescue the auto industry, make ground-breaking investments in new energy, pass historic legislation for health care reform, re-regulate the financial sector, and transform the student loan process- is almost too much to take in. It is like watching a corpse suddenly get up off the pavement and breakdance.
Now, however, conventional wisdom expects our Lazarus government to go back to sleep. On election day, so goes this view, the GOP will take the House, and gridlock will return. The next two years will be a carnival of subpoenas and investigations. The nation will be turned from questions like health care and clean energy to the problem of whether Barack Obama has a birth certificate.
On this score I envy you all over again, because you are going to turn conventional wisdom on its ear! All of the prognostications of imminent doom are based on statistical models that calibrate for "likely voters," and in all of those models you are not "likely voters!" The statisticians (and the GOP candidates measuring the drapes for their new offices) are all counting on you to stay home. Ha! Contemplating the surprise you have in store for them makes me laugh. When you actually show up to vote every playbook will have to be rewritten, every political assumption will have to be reassessed. You will have made revolution twice in as many years. Lucky bastards. Green with envy as I am, I extend you thanks again, in advance.
How I envy you. When I was in college, my comrades and I took to the barricades for Michael Dukakis. Ah, the heady days of youth. We were going to bring the Reagan Era to a screeching halt. Long story short, it did not turn out that way.
You, by contrast, have done what so many generations aspire to but few achieve. You have made revolution; you have made history! You more than any other part of our Republic brought about the presidency of Barack Obama. Bravo! On behalf of the nation I extend you thanks!
Since then you may have heard a lot of whingeing (mainly on the part of Baby Boomers) that Barack Obama is a big disappointment, that he has fallen short of expectations. Don't believe it! In my entire life before 2009 I was witness to a single piece of landmark, progressive social legislation- the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 (during the Nixon presidency). The excitement of that moment was lost on me at the time- I was three years old. The next 39 years were rather surreal, watching a government that seemed incapable of doing ANYTHING.
Against that backdrop, the last two years have been a shock. To see our government do so much- avert a depression, rescue the auto industry, make ground-breaking investments in new energy, pass historic legislation for health care reform, re-regulate the financial sector, and transform the student loan process- is almost too much to take in. It is like watching a corpse suddenly get up off the pavement and breakdance.
Now, however, conventional wisdom expects our Lazarus government to go back to sleep. On election day, so goes this view, the GOP will take the House, and gridlock will return. The next two years will be a carnival of subpoenas and investigations. The nation will be turned from questions like health care and clean energy to the problem of whether Barack Obama has a birth certificate.
On this score I envy you all over again, because you are going to turn conventional wisdom on its ear! All of the prognostications of imminent doom are based on statistical models that calibrate for "likely voters," and in all of those models you are not "likely voters!" The statisticians (and the GOP candidates measuring the drapes for their new offices) are all counting on you to stay home. Ha! Contemplating the surprise you have in store for them makes me laugh. When you actually show up to vote every playbook will have to be rewritten, every political assumption will have to be reassessed. You will have made revolution twice in as many years. Lucky bastards. Green with envy as I am, I extend you thanks again, in advance.
Saturday, October 02, 2010
Consuming China
On Wednesday the House of Representatives passed the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (H.R. 2378), a bill that would impose tariff penalties on Chinese goods unless the PRC allows the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar. In the lead-up to and in the wake of this event, there has been much media commentary on the escalating showdown between China and the U.S. over currency valuation. In yesterday's New York Times, Paul Krugman ("Taking on China") wrote that the bill is "a step in the right direction." Krugman notes that the undervaluation of the renminbi is causing trade imbalances that not only harm the U.S., but are retarding growth and economic recovery globally. On the same editorial page on Tuesday, Stephen Roach, a senior fellow at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale ("Cultivating the Chinese Consumer"), warned that "forcing such a currency realignment would be a blunder of historic proportions." Roach argues that currency recalibration is not an effective escape from the current predicament, but that only a long-term reorientation of the Chinese economy toward increased consumer spending will redress the imbalances and set global markets back on the road to growth.
These and other well-informed commentators who have weighed in on either side of the issue make substantive arguments, but most American commentators have failed to account for a key dimension of the problem. Krugman and others are no doubt right, the Chinese Communist Party leadership is using monetary policy to keep the value of the renminbi artificially low, thus subsidizing exports to the U.S. and other foreign markets. But U.S. observers and leaders underestimate the power of the domestic Chinese political forces that drive CCP leaders to this choice.
Since the Tiananmen conflict of 1989 the CCP has labored under a persistent legitimacy deficit, one that it can only overcome through the maintenance of uninterrupted growth and full employment. An increasingly prosperous population has not forgotten its earlier aspirations for a more participatory government and a more liberal political culture. Unrest is only forstalled by the tacit understanding that inertia in political reform will be tolerated as long as economic prosperity is maintained. Any slackening of the rising tide of prosperity will reawaken the political grievances simmering below the surface of the social scene. This could lead to massive unrest, perhaps even to the overthrow of the CCP itself. In the face of such potential disaster, there is little with which the U.S. can threaten Chinese leaders. The displeasure of the U.S. President or Congress holds little terror next to the rising anger of the great mass of China's citizens.
If the tariffs imposed by the House ever do go into effect, it will of course create just the sort of economic pain Beijing hopes to avoid at all cost, but the CCP leadership will have the recourse of portraying that misfortune to their own people as the result of U.S. economic aggression. If a drop in growth and employment must come, having it come because of Washington rather than Beijing would, from the perspective of the CCP, definitely be the lesser of two evils. Given the "caged and cornered" outlook of CCP leaders, Beijing is most likely to keep calling Washington's bluff until the brink has been reached and passed, and a full-blown trade war gets underway.
Though such circumstances argue against the wisdom of the House's recent action, policies like that proposed by Stephen Roach are also problematic, for similar reasons. Any measures to increase consumer spending in China would, like a drop in employment, re-open the issue of political reform. As consumption increases so does official corruption, a problem which is already at epic levels throughout the PRC. Moreover, as people consume they increasingly come to think of themselves as property owners with a greater stake in the system at large. The more I buy, the more I have to lose, and the more means I will want to protect what I have. It is rare to find a society in which a citizen who is a consumer is not also a voter, or at least wants to be. Finally, increased consumption in China would add to the already dire ecological crisis she faces. Anyone who has seen the state of public sanitation in many areas of China given current levels of consumption will understand that a major overhaul of the political system will be necessary to mitigate the damage of an increase. To create the conditions that would foster local governance capable of handling such growth, power must devolve from Beijing onto the provinces, localities, and citizens, otherwise local authorities could not be held accountable for the tasks that must be undertaken.
A shift to a more consumer-driven economy in China is thus not possible in the absence of a simultaneous process of political decentralization and democratization, a fact of which the CCP leadership is aware. This is, in fact, one of the latent motivations for Beijing's monetary policy. Besides fueling exports, undervaluing the renminbi has the serendipitous effect of suppressing consumption, obviating the need for the kinds of political reforms that would otherwise be necessary in the face of rising prosperity.
What do all of these facts mean from the perspective of U.S. policymakers? Unfortunately, given the power of the inertial forces driving Beijing's currency policy, the U.S. possesses virtually no effective levers of persuasion. The trade imbalances created by the undervaluation of the renminbi are a real problem for the U.S., but it is unrealistic for American leaders to expect that they may be resolved either diplomatically or through punitive legislation. The best measures that can be taken in the face of this problem are changes in U.S. domestic economic policy. Tax incentives and public investments in industries that can compete in Chinese markets despite Beijing's efforts at currency manipulation are the most effective tools at the disposal of U.S. leaders, and have the added appeal of increasing employment and prosperity at home in the short term. Beyond this, everyone's best hope is that leaders and citizens in China will undertake the kind of political reforms that will alleviate the dysfunctional conditions fostering today's trade imbalances.
These and other well-informed commentators who have weighed in on either side of the issue make substantive arguments, but most American commentators have failed to account for a key dimension of the problem. Krugman and others are no doubt right, the Chinese Communist Party leadership is using monetary policy to keep the value of the renminbi artificially low, thus subsidizing exports to the U.S. and other foreign markets. But U.S. observers and leaders underestimate the power of the domestic Chinese political forces that drive CCP leaders to this choice.
Since the Tiananmen conflict of 1989 the CCP has labored under a persistent legitimacy deficit, one that it can only overcome through the maintenance of uninterrupted growth and full employment. An increasingly prosperous population has not forgotten its earlier aspirations for a more participatory government and a more liberal political culture. Unrest is only forstalled by the tacit understanding that inertia in political reform will be tolerated as long as economic prosperity is maintained. Any slackening of the rising tide of prosperity will reawaken the political grievances simmering below the surface of the social scene. This could lead to massive unrest, perhaps even to the overthrow of the CCP itself. In the face of such potential disaster, there is little with which the U.S. can threaten Chinese leaders. The displeasure of the U.S. President or Congress holds little terror next to the rising anger of the great mass of China's citizens.
If the tariffs imposed by the House ever do go into effect, it will of course create just the sort of economic pain Beijing hopes to avoid at all cost, but the CCP leadership will have the recourse of portraying that misfortune to their own people as the result of U.S. economic aggression. If a drop in growth and employment must come, having it come because of Washington rather than Beijing would, from the perspective of the CCP, definitely be the lesser of two evils. Given the "caged and cornered" outlook of CCP leaders, Beijing is most likely to keep calling Washington's bluff until the brink has been reached and passed, and a full-blown trade war gets underway.
Though such circumstances argue against the wisdom of the House's recent action, policies like that proposed by Stephen Roach are also problematic, for similar reasons. Any measures to increase consumer spending in China would, like a drop in employment, re-open the issue of political reform. As consumption increases so does official corruption, a problem which is already at epic levels throughout the PRC. Moreover, as people consume they increasingly come to think of themselves as property owners with a greater stake in the system at large. The more I buy, the more I have to lose, and the more means I will want to protect what I have. It is rare to find a society in which a citizen who is a consumer is not also a voter, or at least wants to be. Finally, increased consumption in China would add to the already dire ecological crisis she faces. Anyone who has seen the state of public sanitation in many areas of China given current levels of consumption will understand that a major overhaul of the political system will be necessary to mitigate the damage of an increase. To create the conditions that would foster local governance capable of handling such growth, power must devolve from Beijing onto the provinces, localities, and citizens, otherwise local authorities could not be held accountable for the tasks that must be undertaken.
A shift to a more consumer-driven economy in China is thus not possible in the absence of a simultaneous process of political decentralization and democratization, a fact of which the CCP leadership is aware. This is, in fact, one of the latent motivations for Beijing's monetary policy. Besides fueling exports, undervaluing the renminbi has the serendipitous effect of suppressing consumption, obviating the need for the kinds of political reforms that would otherwise be necessary in the face of rising prosperity.
What do all of these facts mean from the perspective of U.S. policymakers? Unfortunately, given the power of the inertial forces driving Beijing's currency policy, the U.S. possesses virtually no effective levers of persuasion. The trade imbalances created by the undervaluation of the renminbi are a real problem for the U.S., but it is unrealistic for American leaders to expect that they may be resolved either diplomatically or through punitive legislation. The best measures that can be taken in the face of this problem are changes in U.S. domestic economic policy. Tax incentives and public investments in industries that can compete in Chinese markets despite Beijing's efforts at currency manipulation are the most effective tools at the disposal of U.S. leaders, and have the added appeal of increasing employment and prosperity at home in the short term. Beyond this, everyone's best hope is that leaders and citizens in China will undertake the kind of political reforms that will alleviate the dysfunctional conditions fostering today's trade imbalances.
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Letter to President Obama on Afghanistan
Dear President Obama,
In your speech of March 27, 2009, you laid out in clear terms why the conflict in Afghanistan is a vital security concern to the United States. As you stated then, Afghanistan was and is a "war of necessity;" the U.S. had no choice but to engage those harboring the murderers of more than 3,000 Americans. Unfortunately, under the previous administration the conflict was both under-resourced and conceptually ill-planned, resulting in eight years of stalemate. Your call for renewed effort, increased commitment, and a global strategic overhaul was absolutely correct, as was your decision to increase U.S. troop levels by 17,000 personnel.
I am distressed, therefore, to see signs that you are contemplating a retreat from this wise declaration of resolve. Partisan politics has predictably created a perfect storm of opposition to your Afghan policy, coming from all parts of the political spectrum. This should not, however, dissuade you from the correctness of the strategic principles on which you campaigned. As a long-time supporter and a donor from the days before the Iowa caucuses, I write to express my support for your position on Afghanistan and Pakistan as it was originally formulated: that this theater represents the true epicenter of the war against al-Qaeda, and must be engaged with all the strategic resources and energies of the United States. I would urge you not to capitulate to political pressure, but to implement the advice of the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal.
Like you I opposed the invasion of Iraq, and agree that the mission there was an unfortunate distraction from the vital conflict in Afghanistan. Though almost every aspect of the previous administration's strategic thinking with regard to Iraq was deeply flawed, one important principle is exemplified by that experience. The resolve that the Bush administration evinced in Iraq must be doubly applied to Afghanistan, as the stakes in the latter mission are exponentially higher.
Withdrawal from Iraq was and is a viable strategic option from the perspective of U.S. security, where withdrawal from Afghanistan is not. Al-Qaeda never had genuine traction within Iraqi society. It was absent from Iraq during the regime of Saddam Hussein and only achieved a tenuous foothold there as a result of the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion. We can be highly confident, therefore, that a worst-case scenario does not include a robust presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraqis have historically exhibited a low tolerance for al-Qaeda, and there is no reason to expect that will change in the near or short term.
Such calculations do not apply in Afghanistan.The Iraqis are deeply divided by sectarian allegiances and united (with the exclusion of the Kurds) by their common Arab ethnicity, thus religious ideologies like that of al-Qaeda have little political utility in Iraqi society. The situation is reversed in Afghanistan (and central Asia more broadly). There the community is riven by ethnic divisions but largely united by a common affiliation with Sunni Islam, thus a politicized religious ideology like that of al-Qaeda or the Taliban can be an effective mechanism for building broad strategic coalitions. Where the presence of U.S. troops boosted al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, it is only the insertion of U.S. troops that effectively displaced both al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. Where a U.S. withdrawal will not increase al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan will almost certainly result in the return of al-Qaeda to its bases of operation there.
Though the worst-case scenario for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq presents no compelling argument for constraint, the best-case scenario for a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan gives genuine cause for alarm. It is true that the Taliban is deeply unpopular through much of Afghanistan, and may not possess the strategic power to retake Kabul in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal. Even if they do not, however, we can be certain that the Taliban, already deeply entrenched despite a robust ISAF presence, will enjoy an even broader and more deeply rooted position along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier once the ISAF is gone.
This would effectively constitute a "Talibanistan" quasi-state, one empowered, in the absence of either the ISAF or a robust Afghan government, to cultivate and manage its own revenues (from narcotics smuggling and other enterprises) and to conduct foreign policy with neighboring nations and international organizations. The mayhem that might be sewn by such a "Talibanistan" is difficult to overestimate. The possibilities range from abetting extremist groups in Pakistan and elsewhere to purchasing nuclear technology from rogue elements of the Pakistani intelligence services. Though al-Qaeda and the Taliban should of course be treated as distinct from a tactical perspective, in general strategic terms they both represent an equivalent threat to the security of the U.S.
Critics of the Afghan mission might protest that we are faced with the choice of either allowing a "Talibanistan" to emerge or committing to a permanent U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. This is not true. As General McChrystal observes in his strategic assessment, the Afghan people themselves are deeply disaffected with the Taliban and its history of abusive rule. They have lived through the results of rapid U.S. disengagement following the Soviet defeat of the 1980's, and are open to a partnership with NATO in pursuit of a more stable and progressive social contract, if only the U.S. and its allies will demonstrate the resolve that had been lacking in the past. A window of opportunity exists to assist the Afghans in establishing a robust state of their own, one that would effectively counter the influence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the region. The window will be lost, however, if the U.S. wavers at this critical moment in the mission.
It has been widely reported in the press that you are contemplating an alternative strategy championed by Vice President Biden, a plan to reduce our forces in Afghanistan and redirect their mission toward rooting out al-Qaeda along the Pakistan frontier. This would be an extremely unwise change of course. As General McChrystal and other analysts have noted, the crux of the struggle against both al-Qaeda and the Taliban is not military, but political. Al-Qaeda will not be dislodged from the region as long as state authority remains weak and local society remains embattled. There is no alternative remedy to a sustained counterinsurgency campaign that combines military operations with improved governance and efforts to bolster state legitimacy. Deploying a small force that ignores the plight of the Afghan people as it engages in a wild goose chase after al-Qaeda operatives is a recipe for disaster. Such a strategy would be rapidly self-subverting and surely leave the U.S. less secure in the long term.
General McChrystal lays out in stark terms the profound difficulties entailed by the strategic objectives of an intensified Afghan mission. The parallels to Vietnam are numerous and real. The insurgency enjoys the advantage of a difficult terrain, numerous outside sources of assistance, and the tactical cover of the frontier with Pakistan. One stark difference with Vietnam is determinative of our strategic priorities going forward, however. Unlike Vietnam, the Afghan-Pakistani theater harbors forces that have directly attacked the United States and are planning to do so again if given the opportunity. The U.S. thus has no choice but to pursue this counterinsurgency campaign despite its daunting obstacles.
Among the many outstanding policy shifts you initiated upon taking office was an overhaul of the mechanisms by which strategic decisions were made in the executive branch. The previous administration had all but completely politicized the strategic planning process, thus in most instances when the former President declared that he was "consulting with his generals" everyone understood that he was waiting to be told what he originally wanted to hear. Thus far you have demonstrably operated in a different mode. The past few years have brought to the fore a new generation of erudite and sophisticated commanders, such as General David Petraeus and Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, who have adapted to the strategic and tactical complexities of our ongoing engagements. You have demonstrated, with moves such as the appointment of General McChrystal in Afghanistan, your resolve to work with this new generation of commanders in the crafting of an effective strategy for mission success.
Having made these initial steps in the reform of executive strategic culture, I would urge you not to retreat now. Do not allow your planning of policy to be derailed by partisan politics. You tasked General McChrystal with developing an informed, coherent, and intelligent strategic plan for the mission in Afghanistan, and he has risen to those demands. Do not set aside his counsel, and your own strategic judgment, because of the pressure being exerted upon you by misguided or self-serving politicians. You have the opportunity to establish the kind of sober, deliberate strategic process our nation desperately needs in this time of crisis. Please do not let that opportunity pass.
The politics of an intensified Afghan mission here at home present obvious difficulties. The electorate has been disenchanted by eight years of official obfuscation and strategic inertia. The security stakes are too high, however, to admit faltering in the face of such challenges. Efforts must be made to explain the necessity of the mission to the public at large. Democrats like myself (to borrow a phrase, the "silent majority" who support the continued Afghan mission) should be systematically mobilized to counter and deflect pressure from the "left." Most importantly, the opportunity for genuine bipartisanship should be seized. Republicans like Senator John McCain and independents like Senator Joseph Lieberman may be persuaded to rally in support of a strategy derived from the assessment of General McChrystal. Though consensus may never be reached on contentious domestic issues such as health care and energy policy, our common national security interests may serve as the focal point of a broad centrist coalition that would drive the implementation of a difficult but necessary strategic engagement.
Like millions of Americans I was inspired by your tough yet elegant campaign and by your historic election to our highest office. I know that your patriotism is unsurpassed by any citizen's, and remain confident of your leadership in days ahead. Please accept my thanks for your attention and my prayers for your continued success in the execution of your duties.
Sincerely,
Andrew Meyer
In your speech of March 27, 2009, you laid out in clear terms why the conflict in Afghanistan is a vital security concern to the United States. As you stated then, Afghanistan was and is a "war of necessity;" the U.S. had no choice but to engage those harboring the murderers of more than 3,000 Americans. Unfortunately, under the previous administration the conflict was both under-resourced and conceptually ill-planned, resulting in eight years of stalemate. Your call for renewed effort, increased commitment, and a global strategic overhaul was absolutely correct, as was your decision to increase U.S. troop levels by 17,000 personnel.
I am distressed, therefore, to see signs that you are contemplating a retreat from this wise declaration of resolve. Partisan politics has predictably created a perfect storm of opposition to your Afghan policy, coming from all parts of the political spectrum. This should not, however, dissuade you from the correctness of the strategic principles on which you campaigned. As a long-time supporter and a donor from the days before the Iowa caucuses, I write to express my support for your position on Afghanistan and Pakistan as it was originally formulated: that this theater represents the true epicenter of the war against al-Qaeda, and must be engaged with all the strategic resources and energies of the United States. I would urge you not to capitulate to political pressure, but to implement the advice of the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal.
Like you I opposed the invasion of Iraq, and agree that the mission there was an unfortunate distraction from the vital conflict in Afghanistan. Though almost every aspect of the previous administration's strategic thinking with regard to Iraq was deeply flawed, one important principle is exemplified by that experience. The resolve that the Bush administration evinced in Iraq must be doubly applied to Afghanistan, as the stakes in the latter mission are exponentially higher.
Withdrawal from Iraq was and is a viable strategic option from the perspective of U.S. security, where withdrawal from Afghanistan is not. Al-Qaeda never had genuine traction within Iraqi society. It was absent from Iraq during the regime of Saddam Hussein and only achieved a tenuous foothold there as a result of the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion. We can be highly confident, therefore, that a worst-case scenario does not include a robust presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraqis have historically exhibited a low tolerance for al-Qaeda, and there is no reason to expect that will change in the near or short term.
Such calculations do not apply in Afghanistan.The Iraqis are deeply divided by sectarian allegiances and united (with the exclusion of the Kurds) by their common Arab ethnicity, thus religious ideologies like that of al-Qaeda have little political utility in Iraqi society. The situation is reversed in Afghanistan (and central Asia more broadly). There the community is riven by ethnic divisions but largely united by a common affiliation with Sunni Islam, thus a politicized religious ideology like that of al-Qaeda or the Taliban can be an effective mechanism for building broad strategic coalitions. Where the presence of U.S. troops boosted al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, it is only the insertion of U.S. troops that effectively displaced both al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. Where a U.S. withdrawal will not increase al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan will almost certainly result in the return of al-Qaeda to its bases of operation there.
Though the worst-case scenario for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq presents no compelling argument for constraint, the best-case scenario for a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan gives genuine cause for alarm. It is true that the Taliban is deeply unpopular through much of Afghanistan, and may not possess the strategic power to retake Kabul in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal. Even if they do not, however, we can be certain that the Taliban, already deeply entrenched despite a robust ISAF presence, will enjoy an even broader and more deeply rooted position along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier once the ISAF is gone.
This would effectively constitute a "Talibanistan" quasi-state, one empowered, in the absence of either the ISAF or a robust Afghan government, to cultivate and manage its own revenues (from narcotics smuggling and other enterprises) and to conduct foreign policy with neighboring nations and international organizations. The mayhem that might be sewn by such a "Talibanistan" is difficult to overestimate. The possibilities range from abetting extremist groups in Pakistan and elsewhere to purchasing nuclear technology from rogue elements of the Pakistani intelligence services. Though al-Qaeda and the Taliban should of course be treated as distinct from a tactical perspective, in general strategic terms they both represent an equivalent threat to the security of the U.S.
Critics of the Afghan mission might protest that we are faced with the choice of either allowing a "Talibanistan" to emerge or committing to a permanent U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. This is not true. As General McChrystal observes in his strategic assessment, the Afghan people themselves are deeply disaffected with the Taliban and its history of abusive rule. They have lived through the results of rapid U.S. disengagement following the Soviet defeat of the 1980's, and are open to a partnership with NATO in pursuit of a more stable and progressive social contract, if only the U.S. and its allies will demonstrate the resolve that had been lacking in the past. A window of opportunity exists to assist the Afghans in establishing a robust state of their own, one that would effectively counter the influence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the region. The window will be lost, however, if the U.S. wavers at this critical moment in the mission.
It has been widely reported in the press that you are contemplating an alternative strategy championed by Vice President Biden, a plan to reduce our forces in Afghanistan and redirect their mission toward rooting out al-Qaeda along the Pakistan frontier. This would be an extremely unwise change of course. As General McChrystal and other analysts have noted, the crux of the struggle against both al-Qaeda and the Taliban is not military, but political. Al-Qaeda will not be dislodged from the region as long as state authority remains weak and local society remains embattled. There is no alternative remedy to a sustained counterinsurgency campaign that combines military operations with improved governance and efforts to bolster state legitimacy. Deploying a small force that ignores the plight of the Afghan people as it engages in a wild goose chase after al-Qaeda operatives is a recipe for disaster. Such a strategy would be rapidly self-subverting and surely leave the U.S. less secure in the long term.
General McChrystal lays out in stark terms the profound difficulties entailed by the strategic objectives of an intensified Afghan mission. The parallels to Vietnam are numerous and real. The insurgency enjoys the advantage of a difficult terrain, numerous outside sources of assistance, and the tactical cover of the frontier with Pakistan. One stark difference with Vietnam is determinative of our strategic priorities going forward, however. Unlike Vietnam, the Afghan-Pakistani theater harbors forces that have directly attacked the United States and are planning to do so again if given the opportunity. The U.S. thus has no choice but to pursue this counterinsurgency campaign despite its daunting obstacles.
Among the many outstanding policy shifts you initiated upon taking office was an overhaul of the mechanisms by which strategic decisions were made in the executive branch. The previous administration had all but completely politicized the strategic planning process, thus in most instances when the former President declared that he was "consulting with his generals" everyone understood that he was waiting to be told what he originally wanted to hear. Thus far you have demonstrably operated in a different mode. The past few years have brought to the fore a new generation of erudite and sophisticated commanders, such as General David Petraeus and Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, who have adapted to the strategic and tactical complexities of our ongoing engagements. You have demonstrated, with moves such as the appointment of General McChrystal in Afghanistan, your resolve to work with this new generation of commanders in the crafting of an effective strategy for mission success.
Having made these initial steps in the reform of executive strategic culture, I would urge you not to retreat now. Do not allow your planning of policy to be derailed by partisan politics. You tasked General McChrystal with developing an informed, coherent, and intelligent strategic plan for the mission in Afghanistan, and he has risen to those demands. Do not set aside his counsel, and your own strategic judgment, because of the pressure being exerted upon you by misguided or self-serving politicians. You have the opportunity to establish the kind of sober, deliberate strategic process our nation desperately needs in this time of crisis. Please do not let that opportunity pass.
The politics of an intensified Afghan mission here at home present obvious difficulties. The electorate has been disenchanted by eight years of official obfuscation and strategic inertia. The security stakes are too high, however, to admit faltering in the face of such challenges. Efforts must be made to explain the necessity of the mission to the public at large. Democrats like myself (to borrow a phrase, the "silent majority" who support the continued Afghan mission) should be systematically mobilized to counter and deflect pressure from the "left." Most importantly, the opportunity for genuine bipartisanship should be seized. Republicans like Senator John McCain and independents like Senator Joseph Lieberman may be persuaded to rally in support of a strategy derived from the assessment of General McChrystal. Though consensus may never be reached on contentious domestic issues such as health care and energy policy, our common national security interests may serve as the focal point of a broad centrist coalition that would drive the implementation of a difficult but necessary strategic engagement.
Like millions of Americans I was inspired by your tough yet elegant campaign and by your historic election to our highest office. I know that your patriotism is unsurpassed by any citizen's, and remain confident of your leadership in days ahead. Please accept my thanks for your attention and my prayers for your continued success in the execution of your duties.
Sincerely,
Andrew Meyer
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