Hamas' victory in Palestinian elections will no doubt injure the peace process and bring further suffering to both Israel and Palestine. Try as one might, it is hard to peer ahead and see a good future outcome from these events. Even so, the tone of U.S. and European news coverage of Hamas' electoral triumph is benighted and egregiously biased. Again and again one reads of the "mistake" Palestinian voters have made and how they must be shown that their choices have "consequences." As if they can possibly be in the dark on that score.
Responsible international governments will not be able to negotiate in good faith with a Hamas-led government as long as it remains constitutionally committed to the destruction of Israel. Hamas' victory thus gives them an effective veto over the peace process, unless and until Hamas reforms its charter all progress along the "road map" is halted. Pundits and magi across the globe are shaking their heads and decreeing that Palestinian voters should have known as much, now they will have to reap the whirlwind. But Palestinians went into voting booths having read the same newscasts that the rest of the "shocked" world had, declaring that though Hamas would poll strongly Fatah would emerge with a ruling majority, so interpreting this last election as a popular anti-peace mandate is a fallacy.
Moreover, no one that I have read or heard has even contemplated putting some of the blame for Hamas' victory where it obviously belongs- on the Bush and Sharon administrations. Ariel Sharon's bold realignment of the Israeli political field demonstrated that he was earnest in his moves toward Palestinian statehood. Even so, his policy of unilateral disengagement sent a clear message to Palestinians to which they were obviously paying attention- it does not matter who is in charge on the Palestinian side, Israel will pursue whatever policy it deems best. If the composition of Palestinian leadership can have no influence on Israel's actions, then Palestinian voters can not be wholly blamed for disregarding how their vote might impact the peace process in the long term.
In more instrumental terms the Sharon policy helped engineer Fatah's defeat through cloaking it in a mantle of impotence. To the extent that pundits around the world will grant any rationality to Palestinian voters at all, they bemoan the fact that Fatah's inveterate corruption has led to this dark day. Corrupt Fatah is, but I challenge anyone to find a living member of Fatah who can compete with Jack Abramoff for sheer unscrupulousness. However corrupt Fatah may be, their poll returns might have been much higher had the recent Israeli pullout from Gaza not shown them to be totally irrelevant to that process. Indeed, the unilateral nature of the pullout made it a PR bonanza for Hamas, enabling them to go from hiding underground to parading armed through the streets overnight, thus taking credit for an event in which Fatah was given no "sound bite" presence whatsoever.
The U.S. Bush administration must share in this blame, for though they trumpet the value of democratization in the Middle East they have done very little to proactively nurture it (and yes, I am counting the policy in Iraq). If democratization is truly a cherished Bush goal, they should have understood that a Hamas victory could be disastrous to that end and taken a much more active role in Israel/Palestine affairs much earlier. Instead, the Bush administration created no genuine Israel/Palestine policy of its own but gave its imprimatur to every Israeli policy that have helped bring about Fatah's electoral defeat. Hamas is now in a position not only to derail the peace process, but to set back the cause of democracy in the Arab world by decades. If, having cast their ballots in one of the most democratic elections the Arab world has experienced in recent years Palestinians are then made to suffer (as is inevitable should Hamas prove intransigent), what other message can Arabs around the world possibly receive but that democracy is a pointless charade?
In the end blame for Hamas' victory extends beyond the Bush and Sharon administrations and the Palestinian voters themselves. Blame falls on all of us who have been observing events in the Middle East and have failed to perceive that this might occur. The lesson of the Palestinian election is the same as that of other events in the region- unilateralism is a failed policy and a doomed approach to reform. If the U.S. and Europe want to engage the Middle East in a way that will bring progressive and meaningful change it must do so in concert with autonomous and independent partners in the Arab community. Depriving Middle Eastern people of agency will produce the same negative results as would occur if the U.S. or Europe were treated with corresponding paternalism.
39 comments:
Assuming that other states can deprive the Palestinians of agency (and, presumably, that they can also conversely grant the Palestinians agency) seems to me just as paternalistic as you accuse Bush/Sharon of being. In fact, your argument seems to rely a bit on this contradiction -- the Palestinians have voted in a free and fair election, but the way they voted is someone else's fault.
You say: "Pundits and magi across the globe are shaking their heads and decreeing that Palestinian voters should have known as much, now they will have to reap the whirlwind. But Palestinians went into voting booths having read the same newscasts that the rest of the 'shocked' world had, declaring that though Hamas would poll strongly Fatah would emerge with a ruling majority, so interpreting this last election as a popular anti-peace mandate is a fallacy."
Could you clarify your point here? Are you saying that predictions of Fatah's victory affected the outcome of the vote? If Palestinians understood how a Hamas victory would be viewed by the rest of the world, why can the Hamas victory not be viewed as an anti-peace mandate? I'm willing to entertain the notion that the Hamas victory *isn't,* in fact, an anti-peace mandate, but I don't find your explanation -- at least as provided here -- ultimately convincing.
Just a quibble -- how do you know what the general understanding was, among Palestinians, about the election? What *do* they read? From what sources do they generally get their news, and what were those sources saying? You're assuming what the Palestinians knew or expected, and your assumption may be correct, but it's unproven.
It seems the opposite of paternalism to assume that Israel will do what's best for Israel and the Palestinians will do what's best for the Palestinians. Your position veers perilously close to claiming that Israel's unilateralism made the Palestinians feel insufficiently "empowered." Well, what's more empowering than a free, fair, high-turnout election?
How could the Gaza pullout have been less unilateral, in your opinion? And how would that have changed the outcome of this election?
The "pundits and magi" that you rightly deride (though some are, of course, quite well-informed) can't explain with any degree of certainty the Hamas victory, but the thing is ... nobody can.
Dear Kate Marie,
I never made the argument that anyone deprived the Palestinians of agency in the case of this election, nor did I suggest that they are free of all responsibility for the outcome of the vote. I only asserted what seems obvious, that since Israel and the U.S. had a stake in the outcome of the vote, they should have done everything they could to influence voters, but they did not. Or, rather, they did much to insure that (from their perspective) the worst-case-scenario transpired. Are you seriously suggesting that foreign governments can have no influence over the choices voters make in a domestic election?
Palestinians were and are deprived of agency by Sharon's policy of unilateralism. His government pulled out of Gaza without any negotiation or cooperation with the Palestinian Authority over the time and manner of the withdrawal, and without any attempt to coordinate the removal of Israeli troops with the assumption of police and governing powers by the Palestinian Authority and its defense forces. The result was to make Fatah look irrelevant and weak and Hamas look bold and resurgent. Hamas could not have scripted a better campaign kick-off for themselves.
Moreover, Gaza is the least place where Sharon's policies make Fatah look irrelevant from a Palestinian perspective. Whatever the merits of his government's security fence, the very fact that he refused to treat at all with the PA on its contours can only further erode Fatah's image in the Palestinian electorate's mind. Sharon's Kadima Party seemed set to replay in the West Bank what it had done in Gaza. Though that would in some sense have been a step forward along the "road map," the very fact that such momentous changes were in the offing absent any Palestinian participation can only have created a feeling among Palestinians that a vote for Fatah was a vote for a cypher.
As for your "quibble," if you know of some Arabic-language media that predicted a Hamas win call the White House. I'm sure Condi Rice would like to have it translated so she'll know to whom to go next time when votes are counted. As for media predictions influencing the way people voted, are you suggesting that this would be the first time such a thing had happened? Is it so absurd to think that confidence in a Fatah victory would make at least some voters more comfortable in casting a "protest vote" for Hamas?
Your wish that "Israel will do what's best for Israel and the Palestinians will do what's best for the Palestinians" has been shown up as reductionist by Hamas' victory. The right lesson to draw from these events is that Israel and Palestine will either sink or swim together.
Sharon made the same mistake- his vision seems to have been that the pitfalls which ensnared Barak and Clinton could be avoided if Israel moved without a Palestinian counterpart. Surely had he attempted negotiation with the PA what he undertook would have been harder to accomplish, but these new events show finally that unilateralism was a pipe dream. Better to do things the hard way than not at all. Essential, in fact.
Dear Madman,
"As for your "quibble," if you know of some Arabic-language media that predicted a Hamas win call the White House. I'm sure Condi Rice would like to have it translated so she'll know to whom to go next time when votes are counted."
-- But your sarcasm doesn't really answer my question. *You* made a claim about what Palestinians expected. *You* back it up. What do they read as news sources? How many of them read news? What did those sources say? It's not *absurd* per se to suggest that media predictions influenced the way people voted, but the argument I've generally heard made is that it depresses turnout, especially among those who see their choice as a sure loser. It's not *impossible* that what you posit as having occurred actually did occur, but it's only a guess. It's interesting to speculate about, I suppose, but why not wait until you have something concrete to back it up?
"The right lesson to draw from these events is that Israel and Palestine will either sink or swim together."
-- I'm not really talking about unilateral action versus bilateral action, though. Even if Israel were pursuing the bilateral course you prefer, I would assume Israel was acting in Israel's interests, not that Israel was taking the best interests of the Palestinians into account (except insofar as appearing to do so helped Israel itself). And should the Palestinians take the interests of the Israelis into account? Has anyone on the Palestinian side suggested they do so? Not expecting that or demanding it from the Palestinians amounts to head-patting just as surely as acting unilaterally.
Kate Marie,
Here's a link to an Al-Jazeera story about a poll showing that 3/4 of Palestinians want Hamas to give up its call for the destruction of Israel:
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/92C2A0B5-793F-4409-9CEA-A4F7E4985850.htm
That supports my contention that the vote was not an anti-peace mandate. Here is another Al-Jazeera story from 1/21 predicting a narrow Fatah victory:
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/E6113F4F-A1B7-4339-BE78-612B9B2C3DD1.htm
If you want to know more about the news-consumption habits of the Palestinians, why don't you do some research, KM? I'm satisfied that my argument is sound, if you feel it was some wild claim show me the proof that it was not.
As for Israel doing what is good for Israel and etc., that is a complete tautology in any other context but the peace process. Where peace is concerned, what is good for Israel is the same as what is good for Palestine- the pursuit of a two-state solution, and for such a solution to be reached Israel and Palestine must work together. If this poll quoted by Al-Jazeera is any indication then the majority of Palestinians understand this, and they would like to see Hamas "do what is good for Israel (stop seeking Israel's destruction)." No one expects either party in this conflict to achieve sainthood overnight, but a minimum proactive commitment to coexistence is necessary if endless suffering is to be averted.
I'll second Kate Marie's point: you make a whole lot of assertions here, and its completely unclear what exactly the source for these assertions is. Do you have some sort of crystall ball which allows you to peer into the hearts of ordinary Palestinians and into the minds of the Palestinian leadership, the results of which you are presenting here?
For example, you write:
"[Sharon's] policy of unilateral disengagement sent a clear message to Palestinians to which they were obviously paying attention- it does not matter who is in charge on the Palestinian side, Israel will pursue whatever policy it deems best."
I could just as well say that Sharon's policy signalled the seriousness of his intentions to come up with a peaceful solution to the conflict and the obstacles he faced as a result of lacking a credible Palestinian partner.
Israel's policy has never been that it will pursue whatever policy it deems best regardless of the Palestinians; and the arguments of Sharon et al for unilateral withdrawal stemmed from the lack of a partner in the Palestinian leadership. Implicit, of course, is the fact that if a Palestinian leadership which could make and keep guarantees emerge, Israel would alter its behavior.
The point is that its unclear where you get the assertion that THIS is what the message sent to the Palestinians was. How do you know? How do you know it was not the message I outlined above?
And this bit:
"[Sharon's] government pulled out of Gaza without any negotiation or cooperation with the Palestinian Authority over the time and manner of the withdrawal, and without any attempt to coordinate the removal of Israeli troops with the assumption of police and governing powers by the Palestinian Authority and its defense forces"
its just plain wrong. See here. Here is a quote:
"Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz and Palestinian civil affairs minister Mohammed Dahlan said on Friday that they had set up joint committees to coordinate Israeli and Palestinian sides of the withdrawal."
Obviously, you need to read up on the subject a bit more before writing any further posts.
Alex,
There is no necessary contradiction between the seriousness of Sharon's intentions to find a peaceful resolution to the Israel/Palestine conflict and the Palestinian perception that their leadership choices were being made increasingly irrelevant by Sharon's policy of unilateralism. However serious Sharon's intentions or how bold his initiatives, he would have been better served to either work with the Palestinian partner he had or use what influence he could exert to develop a "credible" Palestinian counterpart.
As for the article you linked to, it shows very little. The meeting it portends between Abbas and Sharon did not in fact happen until late June of 2005, less than eight weeks before the Gaza pullout. I'm sorry, given the scale and complexity of that operation that does not represent a good-faith effort toward "negotiation or cooperation with the Palestinian Authority over the time and manner of the withdrawal" or an "attempt to coordinate the removal of Israeli troops with the assumption of police and governing powers by the Palestinian Authority and its defense forces." Do you imagine that by late June of 2005 every aspect of the Gaza pullout had not been planned to the last detail? Exactly how much input could the PA have had at that point?
Likewise the effective utility of the "committees" your article mentions is belied by the actual events of the Gaza pullout. The case of the abandoned synagogues which caused so much scandal demonstrates that to the last moments the withdrawal remained completely controlled by Israeli domestic policy organs with virtually no input or effective influence from the PA.
"If you want to know more about the news-consumption habits of the Palestinians, why don't you do some research, KM? I'm satisfied that my argument is sound, if you feel it was some wild claim show me the proof that it was not."
-- Are you pronouncing that ex cathedra? Am I supposed to fall to my knees now and declare your infallibility? You're satisfied that your argument about what the Palestinians believed is sound, based on ... what?? As Alex has pointed out, he could as easily declare that the Palestinians believed that Sharon's policies signaled his seriousness about finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. Your claim isn't necessarily wild, but it is a bare assertion -- not unlike the assertions of many of the "pundits and magi" who have commented on this election. *I* haven't written about the Palestinian election. *You* have. I'm supposed to be satisfied that your reasoning is sound, and if I'm not, I have to go out and find evidence that your speculation about the Palestinians' motives are correct?
I just read an editorial in the Los Angeles Times on Sunday, written by an Israeli novelist who is very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, that claimed many Palestinians believed Hamas had driven Israel out of Gaza. If you're curious about his argument, why don't you do some research, Madman?
Dear Kate Marie,
"Are you pronouncing that ex cathedra? Am I supposed to fall to my knees now and declare your infallibility?"
Do you really need to ask this? I would think you knew me well enough by now to take this as given.
"You're satisfied that your argument about what the Palestinians believed is sound, based on ... what??"
This is like that old Bugs Bunny cartoon, "Hunting Season." All of a sudden my argument about the reading habits and *expectations* of the Palestinians has metamorphed into an argument about their beliefs. My "I am satisfied..." comment conveyed my confidence that your list of questions about the media consumption habits of the Palestinians, while very interesting, aren't really germane to my argument. The CIA factbook gives a literacy rate of 91.9% for the Palestinian population, which is comparable to the 95.4% literacy rate among Israelis. By all reports the Israelis were just as shocked as everyone else by the Hamas victory, so unless the Palestinians are reading (or watching, or listening to) news sources that have vastly different information, they could not have had very different expectations than Israelis (many of whom, on the West Bank anyway, are their neighbors) about the outcome of the election.
You interpreted my quip about Condi Rice as pure sarcasm, but it was also meant to suggest why I am so confident that one will not find Arab media that predicted a different outcome for the Palestinian election. I know that the State Department (and the NSA, and the CIA, and...)monitor all Arab media, and if there had been predictions of a Hamas victory in those sources I doubt she would have been caught as off guard as everyone else (she's very smart).
So, KM, for my argument *about Palestinian expectations* to be wrong either 1)the Palestinian would have to be consuming media that gave a very different forecast of the election (see above reasons why this is unlikely) or 2)consuming no media at all. You might insist that #2 is possible, but I would say that the burden of proof falls on you, not me, to demonstrate it. Prima facie it would seem a wonder that a people who had achieved a 91.5% literacy rate did so without consuming any media at all.
So there you go, if you want to insist that my argument about *Palestinian expectations* is "bare assertion" do the research, prove me wrong. Otherwise do that ritual you described above.
As for my argument about *Palestinian motives*, I've already provided you with some evidence, above, in the form of the poll showing a vast Palestinian majority in favor of Hamas' retraction of its threat to destroy Israel. Does this make my argument infallible? No. But it is hardly a "bare assertion," either.
Dear Madman,
You made a claim not just about the expectations for the outcome of the election, but about how those expectations actually influenced the election. As I said before, it's not absurd on its face, but there's no evidence -- at least in your post -- to suggest that what happened was that Palestinians felt comfortable enough about a Fatah victory to cast protest votes for Hamas. As I likewise said before, the most common claim made about polls and predictions is that they depress turnout for the party/candidate that is perceived to be the loser. So why and how did it work so spectacularly in Hamas's favor this time? And, finally, there's no evidence -- at least in your post -- to suggest that the Hamas victory was a response to the perceived futility of engagement with Israel.
As for placing blame on Sharon and Bush, can we then place blame on Barak and Clinton for the intifada? Works for me.
Dear Kate Marie,
If only I'd made any of the arguments you attribute to me I'd be in real trouble. I argued that Palestinian expectations of a Fatah victory precluded interpreting the election as an "anti-peace" mandate, as *some percentage* of voters might have cast their vote for Hamas in the expectation that the final tally would yield a Fatah-led government. Your argument about "polls and predictions" assumes that the Palestinian election follows the same operative principles as electins here in the U.S., but this is a fallacious view. The Palestinian election was not a zero-sum contest, it was based on principles of proportional representation, so the "depressed turnout" factor you cite would not have been in play. If anything, the clear expectation of a Fatah victory would up turnout among anyone seeking to cast a pro-Hamas vote for any reason, as any such increase in the voting pool would boost the impact of a pro-Hamas vote. I didn't attempt to back my assertions up with evidence because it seemed clear that the inherent logic of my analysis made my case- that a simplistic or reductionist read of the election results was not incontestably correct or even valid. There is some good ex post facto evidence for my case in the poll I cited upthread, though. If the Hamas victory was indeed a clear "anti-peace mandate" why woult 3 out of every four Palestinians now declare that Hamas should reconcile itself to coexistence with Israel?
Likewise I never argued that "the Hamas victory was a response to the perceived futility of engagement with Israel." That would be ridiculous, as since Sharon's accession there has effectively been no engagement with Israel, so its "futility" is a null factor. My argument was that Sharon's policy of non-engagement helped make Fatah appear impotent and irrelevant in the eyes of Palestinian voters, *whether they attributed those perceptions to Israeli policy or not(and I suspect many Palestinians did not)*.
I would not deny that Fatah was in large part the architect of its own fall. But given that Fatah was laboring under so much baggage, and given that for Israel, the U.S., and the world at large Fatah was CLEARLY the lesser of two evils, all parties should have done *what they could* to boost Fatah's electoral chances. The one thing Fatah might have brought to the Palestinian political table that would have compensated for (even redeemed) their failings of leadership and integrity in the eyes of Palestinian voters was some semblance that they were instrumental in the process toward statehood. By depriving them of even this appearance Sharon (and Bush) helped push Fatah over the edge into defeat.
I do not imagine, nor would I ever assert, that the peace process would be farther along than it is now had Sharon committed to a policy of bilateral disengagement with the Fatah-led PA. Bilateralism would have meant roadblocks and setbacks, the pace of disengagement would have been slower. Perhaps Israel would not yet be out of Gaza. But if such a policy had been conducted all along I don't see how Hamas could possibly have won this election. Nationhood is such a cherished goal to Palestinians that they would not have risked a Hamas victory if there was even the chance that Fatah was playing an instrumental role toward that end.
Like I wrote to Alex, nothing in my argument necessitates the Palestinians doubting the sincerity of Sharon's policy of disengagement. I am willing to bet that they were, as I am, persuaded of Sharon's commitment to disengagement and ultimate Palestinian statehood. But Sharon's policy left precious little motivation for Palestinians to vote for a party with which they were already disenchanted. This is why I say that unilateralism was a pipe dream. Yes, it was moving faster than bilateralism did or could. But sometimes when you drive fast you drive right into a brick wall, and that is what has happened here.
"There is no necessary contradiction between the seriousness of Sharon's intentions to find a peaceful resolution to the Israel/Palestine conflict and the Palestinian perception that their leadership choices were being made increasingly irrelevant by Sharon's policy of unilateralism. However serious Sharon's intentions or how bold his initiatives"
Well, my point was NOT to say that Sharon's intentions were serious. My point was the speculation on the "message" the pullout sends to the Palestinians is futile. There are a million messages you could read the pullout as indicating...you could read it as demonstrating a concern for the fate of Palestinians under Israeli occupation or demonstrating seriousness for peace or demonstrating disregard for Palestinians. Picking one of these message and saying, as you do, that this was the message sent to the Palestinians is groundless.
As for the data of the meetings I have referred to, note that the pullout had been delayed on multiple occasions due to changes of plans. So, no, one cannot assume that merely because the meeting the article speaks of is 8 weeks prior to the pullout that Palestinians had no input.
Basically, the problem I see with your argument is sourcing: what is your source for the claim that Israel did not coordinate with the PA? There were meetings, and if you like, I can dig up articles about meetings going earlier. You seem to be reasoning that the inability of the PA to control Hamas in the wake of the pullout implies that Israel did not coordinate well enough. It seems more likely that it was due to the endemic weakness of the PA.
As for the synagogues, the PA promised to protect them before the pullout, but could not do so when faced with mobs. The problem there was not lack of coordination; Israel pulled out with assurances, ahead of time, that they would be protected. Rather than being seen as evidence for Israeli non-cooperation, it makes more sense to view this event as a sign, again, of the weakness of Abbas' PA.
Alex,
Nothing in my post precludes there being "a million messages you could read the pullout as indicating." A Palestian (many, many Palestinians) could very easily approve of the Gaza pullout and appreciate Israel's intention while simultaneously feeling that the whole process made Fatah look impotent and inept. You keep searching my words for some arch statement about how Palestinians must feel about Israelis, but this misses my point entirely. My post focused exclusively on how Israeli policy influenced Palestian perceptions of the PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FIELD. Sure, there are many ways a Palestinian might respond to the Gaza pullout vis-a-vis the Israelis. But can the same really be said about *Fatah*? Is there any way that you can construe Sharon's policies as a whole (not just the Gaza pullout) as enhancing Fatah's image, as making Fatah look competent and relevant? If not then you have to concede that whatever the other merits of Sharon's policy, they came at a political cost in contributing to Hamas' victory.
As for meetings and etc., you are really pushing a hard case. The late June meeting between Sharon and Abbas was the SECOND meeting between them since Sharon took power. I'm sorry, whatever other sub rosa coordination was going on between Israel and the PA (and there couldn't have been much, given how things played out) the fact that Sharon only chose to meet with the leader of the PA twice and at such a short remove from the actual execution of the pullout could only leave the perception among Palestinians that the PA and Fatah were sideline players in the whole drama. Waiting until less than eight weeks before the pullout to meet with Abbas could only create the impression that the meeting was to give Abbas forewarnings and instructions, not solicit his input (and frankly, the impression wasn't far off).
As for the synagogue case, you have to do more reading, or reading of a different kind. Originally the PA was given to understand that the Israeli army would demolish the synagogues before departing (the right move). At the last minute that order was rescinded by the Knesset (the worst possible move, given all the options), with the sad scene that finally transpired being the result.
Your argument is based on specific inferences Palestinians must have made from the Israeli pullout - that it showed a disregard for Palestinian opinion, and that it showed Fatah to be inept. These are plausible readings, but there are many other such plausible readings. I could also claim, quite plausibly, that the Israeli pullout ought to have boosted Fatah, as it demonstrated a seriousness for peace even in spite of an inability to come to agreement, thereby boosting the party that doesn't call for the annihilation of Israel (i.e. Fatah as opposed to Hamas). I could also claim, quite plausibly, that Abbas achieved an Israeli pullout while at the same time giving up nothing and yielding no ground as far as future negotiations are concerned.
My point is that all such arguments are equally unconvincing. Do you have a crystal ball that substantiates your claim that the messages you describe - Israeli disregard for Palestinian opinions, Fatah's weakness - are the message Palestinians took from the pullout? More seriously, do you have an opinion poll that says this? If not, then all you have are your own idle speculations.
As for the Sharon and Abbas meetings, I note that you have subtly shifted your claims. Before you had argued that Israel did not coordinate well enough with the Palestinians; now you argue that Israel did not appear to coordinate well enough with the Palestinians. Am I to assume you have given up on your old claim, given that you present no evidence for it? As for your new claim, it suffers from the same problem I outlined earlier: your claims that you understand what impressions these events created in Palestinians. Until backed with some actual evidence that Palestinians did perceive these events this way, and that this influenced their choices in the polls, all you have is speculation.
As for the synangogues, you are right. I apologize for the incorrect claims in my last comment.
Just noticed that you do try to defend your claim that there was not much coordination between Israel and the PA:
"I'm sorry, whatever other sub rosa coordination was going on between Israel and the PA (and there couldn't have been much, given how things played out)"
This simply does not follow. You can't go from "Chaos followed the Israeli pullout" to "There was not enough coordination." Its one explanation, another being simply that Abbas' PA is weak and cannot always control what is going on the ground. Moroever, given everything we know about the relative strenghts of Abbas and Hamas, this is the more likely explanation.
Alex,
"As for the Sharon and Abbas meetings, I note that you have subtly shifted your claims. Before you had argued that Israel did not coordinate well enough with the Palestinians; now you argue that Israel did not appear to coordinate well enough with the Palestinians."
My "claims" haven't shifted. I originally noted that Israel didn't coordinate with the PA at all, and no one has shown me any evidence to contradict that. In my last reply I focused on "appearance" because that is what conditions perceptions and political reactions, but I never asserted that appearance was necessarily out of step with reality. You keep repeating that the circumstances of the Gaza pullout must be read as an index of the weakness of the PA as if that somehow contradicts my argument, but I never made any assertions to the contrary. Indeed, it is precisely the potential for exposing the weakness of the PA that made the unilateral pullout from Gaza feed so handily into Hamas' campaign strategy.
"Your argument is based on specific inferences Palestinians must have made from the Israeli pullout - that it showed a disregard for Palestinian opinion, and that it showed Fatah to be inept."
You are overlooking an important aspect of my argument, Alex. I never claimed that this was necessarily how ALL Palestinians would feel, only ENOUGH TO SWING THE VOTE in favor of Hamas. I'm sure many Palestinian voters voted for Hamas because they hate Israel and want to see it destroyed. Many voted for Hamas purely out of anger at Fatah corruption. Many voted for Hamas because that was the last compaign poster they saw. Even so it defies logic that Fatah would have polled so poorly if they were perceived by Palestinians to be playing an effective role in the progress toward statehood.
"I could also claim, quite plausibly, that the Israeli pullout ought to have boosted Fatah, as it demonstrated a seriousness for peace even in spite of an inability to come to agreement..."
Here you are just being tendentious. Why would Palestinian voters credit Fatah with Israel's "seriousness for peace?" Even if they did, why would it make them feel any better about Fatah? Palestinians (on average) obviously care more about statehood than peace, and nothing as of yet done by the Sharon government would help create the impression that *Fatah* had brought them closer to that goal.
"I never claimed that this was necessarily how ALL Palestinians would feel, only ENOUGH TO SWING THE VOTE..."
OK, and I'm saying you havent provided any evidence that this is so. I'm sorry that my summary skewed your point, but my objection remains: you assert without backing up.
"Why would Palestinian voters credit Fatah with Israel's "seriousness for peace?"
Because Hamas still calls for the annihilation of Israel while Fatah does not, it is plausible that peace-seeking moves on Israel's part should boost Fatah while aggressive movies should boost Hamas.
"You keep repeating that the circumstances of the Gaza pullout must be read as an index of the weakness of the PA as if that somehow contradicts my argument..."
It does not contradict your final conclusion, but it contradicts the logic you use to get there.
You have made the argument that chaos after the pullout implies there was a lack of coordination. However, if you accept that Fatah is weak relative to Hamas - and more importantly, weak not only in the polls but as far as armed muscle on the ground goes - then it seems like that Hamas-driven chaos would have happened regardless of the level of coordination between Israel and the PA. This means that you cannot argue that scenes of chaos imply a lack of coordination.
Once again, there is no contradiction between a weak Fatah and lack of coordination. However, the phenomenon upon which you base your argument - chaos in the wake of the pullout - can be explained by a lack of coordination, a weak Fatah, or both. Therefore, you can't logically claim that the existence of the phenomenon implies a lack of coordination.
Alex,
"[Y]ou cannot argue that scenes of chaos imply a lack of coordination."
I made no such argument. When I wrote that "the way things played out" demonstrated a lack of coordination between the Israeli government and the PA I wasn't referring to "chaos," this is your particular concern. For me events like the synagogue fiasco and the fact that border crossings were not up and running until well after the pullout was complete are clear signs of how thoroughly unilateral the planning and execution of the Gaza disengagement was. If the PA had been treated as a sovereign participant in that process (meaning the pullout itself could not begin until the PA signed off on a final and *binding* plan) both those conditions and many others could not have transpired, irrespective of whatever internal "chaos" broke out as a result of PA weakness.
"Because Hamas still calls for the annihilation of Israel while Fatah does not, it is plausible that peace-seeking moves on Israel's part should boost Fatah while aggressive movies should boost Hamas."
You've got it backwards. Peace-seeking moves naturally work to Hamas' favor, as Hamas can claim that their aggressive stance has caused the Israelis to flinch. Israeli aggression tends to work to Fatah's advantage, as it makes Hamas' violence look like futile and costly provocation. Does this mean that Israel should have become gratuitously aggressive so as to aid Fatah? Of course not. It does mean, however, that in order to nullify the propoganda capital Hamas is set to reap from disengagement it is essential that Fatah be seen as a full sovereign partner in the process itself. This is why unilateral disengagement was bound to have distortional effects on Palestinian domestic politics that would rebound to the detriment of the peace process.
"You've got it backwards. Peace-seeking moves naturally work to Hamas' favor, as Hamas can claim that their aggressive stance has caused the Israelis to flinch."
Maybe, maybe not. I agree that your argument is plausible, but so is mine. As far as I can see, one can come up with plausible arguments for why a peace-seeking unilateral move would help Hamas, and also why it would help Fatah. And thats the problem with your post and your comments: theyre plausible, but one can also come up with plausible reasons for the exact opposite. Which is why unless you back these arguments up with something more concrete, they will remain only speculations.
Alex,
I'm sorry to seem ungracious, but my analysis is a good deal more than plausible, and yours a good deal less. Mine is backed up by the experience of every counterinsurgency struggle of the modern era, yours by...well, nothing. Moreover, your assertions fly in the face of common sense, especially as you never deny that Sharon's policy of unilateralism made Fatah look impotent. If that is the case, then Palestinian voters were supposed to look past Fatah's impotence to see what, exactly? Your whole analysis hangs on the notion that a vote for Hamas was necessarily a vote against peace, but that is demostrably fallacious (see my exchange with Kate Marie, above).
You seem to want to see the Israel/Palestine conflict as a contest between Angels and Demons, but that just isn't the way things are. There are very, very bad people on both side of this issue, and all responsible parties have to tread extremely carefully if those forces aren't going to be allowed to sabotage any hope for peace. Whether you can see it or not unilateralism has been proven a dead end.
Dear Madman,
Where is Alex's previous comments does he present the Israel/Palestine conflict as a contest between Angels and Demons?
Dear Kate Marie,
Please read my comment again. I never argued that he "present[s] the Israel/Palestine conflict as a contest between Angels and Demons," I observed that he SEEMS to want to see it that way. I was making an inference from the general tenor of his comments, as is completely reasonable to do. On what basis, you may ask? Well, there is the fact that he was willing to rebuke me as "uninformed" for suggesting that the Sharon government did not negotiate or coordinate with the PA when the evidence to the contrary is flimsy to nonexistent. He then (ironically, given his "read some more" injunction) leapt to completely false conclusions about the synagogue case, presumably wholly on the basis of his own preconceptions. All of this suggests to me that he sees the conflict through a prior filter, one which sees good intentions and good faith stacked on one side of the conflictual divide. This doesn't make him any worse than many, many observers of the situation (indeed, I give him a great deal of credit for admitting when he is wrong), but if he genuinely cares about Israel/Palestine (as I believe he does) and would like to contribute to the dialogue in a way that would promote peace I would counsel him to be more open-minded in his view of the Palestinians.
"Mine is backed up by the experience of every counterinsurgency struggle of the modern era, yours by...well, nothing."
Your comments may very well be backed by every counterinsurgency struggle of the modern era, but an explanation of this backing is not present in your original post and is not present in any of your comments henceforth. Which, by the way, is the point I've been making all this time: you may very well be right, but unless you are willing to present more arguments - for example, how every counterinsurgency of the modern era supports what you say here - your reasons are insufficient to support the claims you make.
"Moreover, your assertions fly in the face of common sense"
What is "common sense?" It seems to me that when something seems obvious to someone, they call it "common sense."
------------
I won't bother to respond to the inferences you've made based on my comments, and I will decline to make similar inferences about you. I will note, however, that we both goth a fact wrong on this conflict, the only difference being that when I saw that I was wrong, I immediately admitted it; whereas when your claims went against evidence, you kept holding on to them, without evidence, claiming they are true.
Alex,
"We" both got a fact wrong? You use "fact" in the same way you claim I use "common sense." You failed to prevent any evidence that the Sharon government negotiated or coordinated with the PA. The only person who would uncritically accept what you presented as "evidence" that I had erred is someone who thought this was true (as you did at the time you presented your "evidence"):
"[T]he PA promised to protect them before the pullout, but could not do so when faced with mobs. The problem there was not lack of coordination; Israel pulled out with assurances, ahead of time, that they would be protected. Rather than being seen as evidence for Israeli non-cooperation, it makes more sense to view this event as a sign, again, of the weakness of Abbas' PA."
Anyone who was thinking clearly and fairly about the PA, who had even a modicum of ability to see the issue from the PA's perspective, would know to at least check the record before making such claims. Now that you have done so you might want to rethink the demonstrative value of your "evidence."
As for "common sense," it seems fairly uncontroversial to assert that no electorate is inclined to cast a vote for impotence. By your reading Palestinians should have handed Fatah a mandate on the understanding that "a vote for Fatah is a vote for Sharon," but this is a wildly unrealistic way to expect any body of voters to behave. It is like insisting that John Kerry should have received electoral momentum from his "global test" gaffe.
As for why the history of counterinsurgency supports my analysis, I'll quote you again- "read some more." If you can find a historical case in which "peace-seeking moves" on the part of a governing power led to a drop in political support for a militant insurgency I would be very, very surprised.
The U.S. pumped 2 million dollars into a program, after the Gaza pullout, that was designed to make the P.A. look good (without in any way being identified as being associated with the U.S.):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012101431_pf.html
Lets see. You originally claimed that:
"His government pulled out of Gaza without any negotiation or cooperation with the Palestinian Authority over the time and manner of the withdrawal, and without any attempt to coordinate the removal of Israeli troops with the assumption of police and governing powers by the Palestinian Authority and its defense forces."(emphasis mine)
And I replied by quoting a news report:
"Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz and Palestinian civil affairs minister Mohammed Dahlan said on Friday that they had set up joint committees to coordinate Israeli and Palestinian sides of the withdrawal."
And later you said,
"I originally noted that Israel didn't coordinate with the PA at all, and no one has shown me any evidence to contradict that."
Unless you are speaking in some strange dialect of English where the words "any" or "at all" mean something different than what I think them to mean - my conclusion is that if you cannot see how your original claim is contradicted by the passage I quote, it is useless for me to argue with you further.
Alex,
The passage in no way proves that there was any coordination or negotiation between Israel and the PA. Other "facts" in the article turned out to be wrong- it claims that Abbas and Sharon will meet in May, they did not meet until June. That meeting could not have been more than a token event, coming so close to the actual date of the pullout. You need to seek out more evidence to demonstrate that these "committees" your article describes were anything more than window-dressing. The Gaza synagogue fiasco would certainly suggest not.
Kate Marie,
I'm glad the Bush administration had the sense to cough up $2 million- a paltry sum compared to what is being spent monthly in Iraq, and with greater potential to do some good. Obviously it was too little, too late, though.
So what you're saying, Madman, is that setting up committees to coordinate both sides of the withdrawl is no evidence of coordination *AT ALL*? Do you think there's any evidence Alex could come up with that you wouldn't label window dressing?
Are you claiming that it was in Sharon and Bush's power to make Fatah and the PA less impotent? Or is it that they simply should have made them *appear* less impotent? If it's the former, what facts about the state of Fatah and the PA form the basis for your claim? In the second case, isn't it a bit rich for someone who's been accusing others of demonizing the Palestinians to start infantilizing them? Or is it your claim that Fatah and the PA were not, in fact, weak, and were only made to appear so?
On the "too little, too late" point. Yeah, I agree. If only the U.S. and other Western nations had decided to cough up money for the Palestinians a long time ago. Just *think* how much good it would have done.
And you never answered my question from a while back. Who's fault was Intifada II?
Kate Marie,
You never posed a question about Intifada II, I assumed you were just positing a rather absurd hypothetical. It seems your "question" deserves to be answered with another question: What did Barak and Clinton do to cause Intifada II, what could they have done to prevent it?
As for my exchange with Alex, I admit I am holding him to an extreme line, but no more extreme than the line to which he seeks to hold. Even faced with concrete evidence that the PA was politically undermined by the actions of the Sharon government (the synagogue case) he insists that my assertions need more proof. Well, on that standard his "committees" don't really constitute "proof" that I was wrong.
I admit that it is reasonable to assume that there was *some* attempt to "coordinate" (though I would still insist that there was virtually no negotiation whatsoever) Israeli and PA participation in the Gaza pullout, but the facts show that it was a profoundly inept and ultimately ineffectual attempt. In the final analysis mine was an error of degree while Alex's was an error of clear fact. At the very least he should learn in future to pause before declaring himself the best informed in any discussion.
Finally, it in no way infantilizes the PA to assert that the US and Israel could have moved to bolster its power and authority. This is not an indictment of Palestinian character or capability, but arises from the raw dynamics of international diplomacy and geopolitical sovereignty. An emerging nation becomes sovereign to the degree that other sovereign nations treat it as such, thus in the early history of the U.S. it was in the power of nations such as Spain and France to help legitimize and solidify U.S. sovereignty by normalizing diplomatic relations with the new nation. One concrete aspect of Sharon's unilateralism is that it refuses the PA the progressive degrees of recognition and status that would increasingly legitimate Palestinian claims to sovereignty as a matter of both established diplomatic custom and international law. Thus when Palestinians perceive that Fatah and the PA are rendered weak by Sharon's policy they are not in fact mistaken. If Sharon's policies are ever carried to final fruition and Israel disengages from the West Bank and East Jerusalem there will still be no Palestinian nation and the terms of Palestinian sovereignty will still have to be negotiated. The PA will be in a much weaker position at that point then they would be if they had been a full partner in a bilateral disengagement process all along.
Madman,
I'm sorry to see that you will refuse to admit that coordination between Israel and the PA existed when faced with concrete instances of it (i.e. repeated meetings). A more honest debater would have backed away from the undefensible "there wasnt any coordination between Israel and the PA" claim towards the more supportable "there was some coordination between Israel and the PA, but not enough." Not you, though.
I'll close my comments on this thread with some reflections on Israeli-Palestinian coordination during the pullout. These are meant not so much for you, as you've shown yourself to be unpersuadable by facts, as for other random readers who by some chance made it this far down the thread.
While googling for information on this topic, I came across the following quote in a news story written only a few days before the pullout in August:
"Palestinian Interior Minister General Nasser Yousef said earlier that he is satisfied with the level of Israeli-Palestinian security coordination to guarantee a successful withdrawal."
This quote is rather interesting because it contradicts so much PA rhetoric over the previous few months. Indeed, PA officials have been complaining about the lack of coordination in the pullout fairly consistently over the few months preceeding it. Note that I am not saying that they were right - in fact, I'll try to argue below that their complaints were bullshit - but it is a fact that Palestinians complained of Israeli lack of coordination to anyone who would listen.
A good example of this is this interview with the PA's "pull-out coordinator." I link to it because it is rather typical. Yes, there has been Israeli coordination he says, but its been minimal. They haven't done what we want them to do, he says. And what is it that he wants Israel to do?
Quoting from the article:
"Their understanding is to use us for a cover-up to implement their own vision and plan. Our understanding is to solve all issues related to what exists currently in the settlements, so we can plan in a way that can help us prepare for the future.
Their plan doesn’t speak anything about access, sovereignty or a West Bank-Gaza link. All they want is to get the settlers and army out of Gaza and keep overall control over the place. That’s not our vision."
After this he lists some concrete changes he wants Israel to make, which include:
"We desire coordination to gradually ease up restrictions for cargo and individuals, and go back to plans for building a sea port ... What we want is secure and fast trade...We want to end once and for all the "back to back" system of cargo delivery at Karni..."
My translation of this into regular English: Israel wants to coordinate on pulling out troops, while we want to use our coordination meetings to obtain further concessions from Israel, such as access to Egypt, admissions from them relating to our sovereignty, maritime rights, rights to move within Israeli territory, etc.
Its incredibly disingenuous. Coordination of the pullout is supposed to be about making sure there is law and order in the areas Israeli leave. It is NOT supposed to be about giving Palestinians trade agreements related to trade passing through Israeli territory, which is a perfectly legitemate request in general, but has nothing to do with coordinating a pullout.
Israeli President Moshe Katsav made the same point some months before this:
"Palestinian Cabinet Minister Mohammad Dahlan angered Sharon's government recently by suggesting that there would be no coordination unless Israel drops its plans to continue controlling the border between Gaza and Egypt.
"The Palestinians are playing with the [coordination] issue," [Israeli president] Katsav said."
I had not read your last reply to Kate Marie before posting mine. Since you do say
"In the final analysis mine was an error of degree,while Alex's was an error of clear fact."
Since you do admit that it was an error, clearly my criticisms of you in my last are undeserved. Please consider them retracted.
Alex,
Well, like I said in my reply to Kate Marie which you only read after flying off the handle, there may have been some token attempt to coordinate Israeli and PA participation in the pullout, but it was ultimately inept and ineffective.
You again display a willingness to accept "evidence" uncritically and a profound bias in your reading of the situation. The "quote" you cite from Nasser Yousef is taken from a Christian Zionist website, a deeply, deeply doctrinaire and biased source. The fact that you can't or won't evaluate the evidential value of that kind of information doesn't speak well of your judgment.
Your scorn of PA attempts to negotiate for concessions of sovereignty is likewise an index of your prejudice. Your smug declaration that-
"Coordination of the pullout is supposed to be about making sure there is law and order in the areas Israeli leave. It is NOT supposed to be about giving Palestinians trade agreements related to trade passing through Israeli territory, which is a perfectly legitemate request in general, but has nothing to do with coordinating a pullout."
-is so brazenly patronizing as to inspire shock. Who gets to say what the pullout is "supposed to be about?" You obviously think that only the Sharon government may do so legitimately. If you could see things from the perspective of the PA for even a moment you would realize that EVERYTHING to them is necessarily about issues of sovereignty- they have no interest in a pullout that does not strengthen their claims to sovereignty and nationhood. A pullout serves only the interests of the Sharon government UNLESS it openly transfers sovereign powers to the PA under terms that the PA negotiated. Any other kind of pullout (in fact, the pullout which actually transpired) represents merely an Israeli adbication of responsibility, it does not further Palestinian interests in the slightest.
My original claim to which you objected was that there was neither negotiation or coordination with the PA on the part of the Israeli government over the Gaza pullout. Here you provide some very tenuous and dubious evidence of coordination, but you provide even stronger evidence in SUPPORT OF the other part of my claim, that there was no negotiation. Indeed, you seem to cast the Sharon government's refusal to negotiate as some kind of principled stand, which is preposperous. Given that only negotations over sovereignty could serve the interests of the PA the onus fell heavily upon the Sharon government to insure that coordination was comprehensive and effective; the sheer negligence and incompetence that marked Israeli-PA coordination in the pullout is thus doubly to their shame.
The Sharon government made sure that no aspect of the Gaza pullout could strengthen PA claims of sovereignty, and whether you can see it or not that is one of the main reasons that Hamas won this last election.
"...which you only read after flying off the handle"
I did not such thing; my comments were the only logical response to your answer, which refused to acknowledge the obvious and proven - that at least some (i.e. the opposite of not at all, as you claimed) coordination existed . I'm glad you have now done so. Now, if possible, please take some time to analyze the implications of your "error of degree" since you have so kindly provided an analysis of the implication of my error. Please, explain what your inability to acknowledge your mistake over the course of ~20 comments and a week-long discussion implies about your biases in analysing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
"The "quote" you cite from Nasser Yousef is taken from a Christian Zionist website, a deeply, deeply doctrinaire and biased source. The fact that you can't or won't evaluate the evidential value of that kind of information doesn't speak well of your judgment."
The fact that you would say the above doesn't speak well of either your reading comprehension or your ability to use google. The source I linked to is obviously repeating something from the news. In fact, the quote is from Haaretz. Here is the same statement on Google Cache for Haaretz.com.
"Here you provide some very tenuous and dubious evidence of coordination, but you provide even stronger evidence in SUPPORT OF the other part of my claim, that there was no negotiation."
Oh yeah. Statement from the PA interior minister that coordination was fine + creation of joint committees = tenuous evidence. Statement from a PA official in charge of coordination = "even stronger evidence."
"Your scorn of PA attempts to negotiate for concessions of sovereignty is likewise an index of your prejudice. Your smug declaration that...[quote omitted] -is so brazenly patronizing as to inspire shock."
Well, I'm sorry I've shocked you. However, the Palestinians clearly indicated, in their own statements, that they spent the meetings on coordination demanding concessions on trade/sovereignty/passage between Gaza and Egypt. If afterwards it turns out that they could not even take control of the situation, well, I hardly see how Israel can be legitemately blamed for that.
Actually, there is no need to use Google Cache; here is the statement in question on Haaretz.com.
Madman,
If the Sharon government *had* made concessions which helped strengthen P.A. claims of sovereignty, is it not possible -- by your own logic about militant insurgencies gaining support when the government is seen to make concessions -- that that *also* would have redounded to Hamas's benefit, rather than Fatah's?
Alex,
Haaretz.com is a more credible source than the Christian Zionist site you originally linked to, but not an unbiased source of information.
"Please, explain what your inability to acknowledge your mistake over the course of ~20 comments and a week-long discussion implies about your biases in analysing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
My "inability" as you call it implies less about my biases regarding the Israeli-Palestine situation than my discomfort with being patronized. Your "read some more" comment was so obnoxious that it got my ire up and made me more intransigent than I might have been with a more courteous counterpart, especially when it became clear that you were, in fact, no better informed than me and making up "facts" whole cloth on the basis of your own prejudices.
"[T]hey spent the meetings on coordination demanding concessions on trade/sovereignty/passage between Gaza and Egypt. If afterwards it turns out that they could not even take control of the situation, well, I hardly see how Israel can be legitemately blamed for that."
Here again you demonstrate that you just don't get it. The PA could not be expected to spend *any* meeting with the Israelis without demanding concessions on sovereignty, etc., a fact which the Israeli government knows full well (better than you, evidently). The fact that they refused to negotiate the larger political terms of the withdrawal meant that they did not have the full cooperation of the PA. Does this mean that they can be blamed for the conditions of the pullout? Sure, they share in the blame. You seem to assume that the PA should have selflessly dropped its political agenda and become compliant instruments of Israeli policy, but this a)is a completely unrealistic way to expect any political institution to behave; b)totally overlooks what the PA evidently knew but you obstinately refuse to recognize- that Fatah and the PA's political standing within the Palestinian community (and, by extension, the continuing viability of the peace process) was at stake. Whether or not the Sharon government is "to blame" is ultimately a moot point, as now they must live with the consequences in the form of the Hamas victory.
Kate Marie,
The peculiar situation of the Israeli/Palestine conflict make what you are suggesting inaccurate. Hamas can always try to make political hay out of any Israeli concession, but the fact that *within the Palestinian community* they must compete with Fatah for political capital severely curtails the propoganda value they can derive from diplomatic gains. While Hamas might gain some political capital from a diplomatic concession, Fatah gains more, so any such incident represents a "net loss" for Hamas.
As an insurgency Hamas is fighting for a "one-state solution" of the Israel/Palestine question, thus as long as Fatah was in control of the PA Israeli recognition of Palestinian sovereignty would have sapped political capital from Hamas and boosted that of Fatah (through the "net loss" process I describe" above). The most cherished ideal among Palestinians in general is nationhood, and they will throw their support to whichever model, "one-state" or "two-state," they feel is bringing them closer to that goal. If Fatah had been able to achieve diplomatic concessions of sovereignty from Israel it would have lent credence to the "two-state" model among Palestinians. At that point denying Israel's right to exist is self-subverting, as Israel would have been the chief foil for emergent Palestinian sovereignty.
Sharon's unilateral pullout from Gaza played strongest to Hamas political narratives and undermined those of Fatah. The withdrawal of Israeli soldiers, leaving Hamas militants free to parade armed through the streets lent credence to a narrative of military victory, while the PA's inability to dictate the timing of the opening of border crossings, etc. undermined claims that diplomacy could ultimately lead to nationhood.
"Your "read some more" comment was so obnoxious that it got my ire up and made me more intransigent than I might have been with a more courteous counterpart, especially when it became clear that you were, in fact, no better informed than me and making up "facts" whole cloth on the basis of your own prejudices."
OK, I am sorry for being obnoxious. You are right that I should have been more courteous. And for the record I have never claimed to be better informed than you are.
As for making up facts, on any given day, I read about a dozen newspaper articles, participate in 2-3 online discussions like this one, usually engage in an edit war on wikipedia, and participate one one or more discussion of politics in "real life." As a result, I might confuse a fact I've read in the paper with something someone has said to me on some thread or in conversation.
"Haaretz.com is a more credible source than the Christian Zionist site you originally linked to, but not an unbiased source of information."
Couldn't agree more; but I do think it can be ruled out that they made up the quote.
First, I do not think it is a "moot point" whether the Sharon government can be blamed for the rise of Hamas. I mean, you devoted an entire post claiming that it is in part to blame, so that you cannot believe that it is a "moot point" entirely. Secondly, your points about the proper blame that ought to be ascribed to the Sharon government, are, I think, not widely believed. That makes them more important. If I believed that you were right, for example, this would cause me to re-evaluate my opinion of much of Israel's recent policy. I suspect the same would be true for many others.
Secondly, you write:
"The fact that they refused to negotiate the larger political terms of the withdrawal meant that they did not have the full cooperation of the PA."
This is without doubt true, but then you go on to say:
"Does this mean that they can be blamed for the conditions of the pullout? Sure, they share in the blame. You seem to assume that the PA should have selflessly dropped its political agenda and become compliant instruments of Israeli policy"
This I do not agree with (and I do not assume the belief you ascribe to me). I'm dealing with the question of when someone can be blamed for something, something thats potentially a consequence, but not a direct one, of his actions. In this case, I think Israel can only be blamed if it with-held information from the PA that could have helped the PA establish law and order in the wake of the pullout. I assume this information is along the lines of, when its soldiers were going to be leaving, what routes they would take, its schedule, etc.
The argument you would offer: "Israel's refusal to offer political concessions provoked the Palestinians into bad behaviour that resulted in a loss of law and order" cannot be used to blame Israel. Its unreasonable to hold Israel to this standard, blaming it not only for what it does, but for the (potentially unpredictable) reactions of the PA to its actions (after all, the maintenance of law and order is as much in the PA's interest as it is in Israel's; maintaining law and order would by no means have turned the PA into an instrument of Israeli policy). If it is PA actions that resulted in a lack of coordination, then the PA is the appropriate place of blame, regardless of whether its actions were the result of frustration at Israel's behavior.
The only argument I can see that tries to place legitemate blame on the Sharon government rests on the synagogues. I suppose it could be argued that if the synagogues were demolished, then mobs would never have appeared to burn, never resulting in a loss of law and order. This, however, ignores the fact that in recent history mobs and the loss of law and order have occured after major events in PA history, e.g. the recent election. It seems highly unlikely that the pullout would have been any different.
I've enjoyed this thread, guys, but I think I'm ducking out here.
Madman,
I can't decide which of the following should be my final comment to you:
"Okay, Madman, you're the king and I'm just some schnook likes to get slapped around." [maybe this should be my default final comment]
or
"Madman, take your flunkies, and dangle!"
Alex,
"First, I do not think it is a "moot point" whether the Sharon government can be blamed for the rise of Hamas."
I never argued such. Go back and read my comment again. I said that the blame of the Sharon government for any particular incident during the pullout is moot, as their whole policy has contributed to a Hamas victory. That bad consequence overshadows all of the other details of the pullout.
"The argument you would offer: 'Israel's refusal to offer political concessions provoked the Palestinians into bad behaviour that resulted in a loss of law and order'"
Again, I never made such an argument. It would really help if you would pay attention to what I write. I argued that the refusal of the Sharon government to negotiate matters of sovereignty meant that a priori they did not have the full cooperation of the PA. The PA can not be blamed for, to paraphrase you, "using meetings about coordination to negotiate sovereignty" because they could not be expected to do otherwise. The onus for smooth coordination fell on the authors of the policy, the Sharon government, and their intransigent maintenance of a strict policy of unilateralism helped put the kaibosh on coordination of the pullout.
"I suppose it could be argued that if the synagogues were demolished, then mobs would never have appeared to burn, never resulting in a loss of law and order."
You persist in misreading the synagogue case. Here more than anywhere else one can see that if the PA had been perfectly compliant with the Sharon policy coordination would have still fallen to pieces. The only practical solution for the synagogues in the long term was for them to be demolished by the Israeli army, as the PA was right to insist. The fact that the Sharon government allowed the rescinding of the demolition order demonstrates both a lack of good faith at efforts toward coordination and a total lack of concern for the political standing of the PA both at home and abroad.
The PA insisted that the synagogues be demolished because they knew full well that there would be people in Gaza who would like to vandalize them. Is this an indictment of the PA? No, no more than the fact that there are extremists in Israel who have attempted to demolish or actually committed mass murder in the Al Aksa Mosque is an indictment of the Israeli government. Given the raw facts on the ground, and given that the synagogues were going to be empty, useless shells in perpetuity, leaving them standing was to gratuitously saddle the PA with a political and public relations nightmare. What was the PA expected to do, guard the synagogues indefinitely? Demolish them in a somber, dignified way? If the Israelis wanted them to do either (they would NEVER have agreed to the first) such an operation would require weeks of planning and coordination. Rescinding the order for demolition less than 24 hours before the pullout was simple blind stupidity. It created a scene in which the PA was shown weakly attempting to defend the synagogues and failing- in other words, to many Palestinians it showed them up as incompetent Israeli lackeys. It is somewhat speculative on my part, but I would venture that more than any other incident that fiasco helped boost Hamas' election numbers toward victory.
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