Last week's assassination of Rafik Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon, is a troubling augury for the future of the Middle East. The difficulty of ascertaining who perpetrated the deed underscores the fragile nature of civil society in Lebanon. So many contending interests are coiled in tension against one-another that anyone who takes a prominent role on the political stage (as did Mr. Hariri) inevitably places him- or herself in the path of all or most of them. One of the most troubling questions about this reprehensibly violent attack is not who? or why Mr. Hariri? but why now?
Another deeply divided society is that of Iraq. Previously I had worried that as a result of the U.S. invasion Iraq would begin to look like Lebanon (the Lebanon that was broadcast into our homes nightly throughout the 1980's, that is). Now it seems possible that as a result of the U.S. invasion not only Iraq, but Lebanon will look increasingly like Lebanon. The deep investment of U.S. power (to as yet unpredictable effect) in Iraq may well produce a climate of opportunism in the Middle East, a willingness to transgress the bounds of civil institutions that have recently been put on a solid footing. With U.S. forces seemingly stretched to their breaking-point and the U.S. treasury deeply in the red, the prospect for meaningful U.S. retaliation in instances like that of Mr. Hariri might seem dim, the opportunity cost of such abominable behavior uniquely low.
The Bush adminstration's response to Mr. Hariri's death has been characteristically unequivocal. They see the Syrians as the most likely culprits and have demanded that they pay for this outrage by withdrawing from Lebanon. I would never question the desirability of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in ideal terms. But Lebanon and Iraq are in structurally if not morally analogous situations at the moment. Both are nations where the trust in, loyalty to, or fear of central civil institutions is not sufficient to stave off civil war and anarchy. Both nations borrow stabilizing power from another nation with strong state institutions (Syria in the case of Lebanon, the U.S. in the case of Iraq). Again, I would not draw a moral equivalency between the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. But in purely structural terms, the Syrians have been able to produce more stability with fewer soldiers (15,000 as opposed to the U.S. 150,000) than the U.S. has achieved in Iraq. It has occurred to me, as it must surely have occurred to the assassins of Mr. Hariri (whoever they are): if Syria withdraws from Lebanon, who will prevent the re-outbreak of civil war? The U.S.? I can only wonder what the Bush administration's thoughts are on this score. To paraphrase the favorite movie of a friend (and one of my own): "I would worry less if I thought they worried more."
4 comments:
Dear Madman,
Your implicit concluding analogy puts the Bush administration in the Albert Finney role, doesn't it? That's not so bad -- at least Leo has a heart, and "the old man is still an artist with the Thompson." [not sure of the spelling there]
On a more serious note, your contention that the cost of the recent violence in Lebanon has become "uniquely low" needs some explanation, I think. What, in your opinion, would have been the cost of such violence BEFORE the U.S. invasion of Iraq (or if the invasion had never occurred)?
Dear Kate Marie,
Oh, how poorly you remember the text of the second greatest film of all time! The line was not delivered to Leo, but to Caspar. Where that puts the different players in my analogy I will refrain from speculating.
As to the PERCEIVED opportunity cost of violence in Lebanon prior to the invasion of Iraq, I think it might have been quite a bit higher. Teddy Roosevelt cautioned that though one should carry a "big stick" one should "speak softly." The use of the "big stick" immediately depletes its intimidation value, as it alllows those who might fear it to take its full measure. Beyond that, the invasion of Iraq has drained the U.S. treasury and put strain on U.S. alliances that inevitably circumscribes the economic and diplomatic leverage America can bring to bear in the Levant.
Dear Madman,
I don't have my text on hand, but I think that Tom actually delivers the line to Leo first and later repeats it to Johnny Caspar -- one of a couple of "repetitions with a difference" that occur in the FIRST greatest film of all time.
As for the big stick metaphor, I'm not sure it really bolsters your case. The big stick is depleted of "intimidation value" when its wielder is perceived as being largely unwilling to use it. Are you suggesting that whoever committed the recent assassination in Lebanon would have been more reluctant to do so had the U.S. NOT invaded Iraq? Why? Out of fear of military intervention? What economic and diplomatic leverage can the U.S. not use now that it could have used before the Iraq invasion? And for that matter, what would such leverage have accomplished?
Dear Kate Marie,
It's unclear to me why the invasion of Iraq was necessary to prove that the U.S. was willing to use it's "big stick." After Panama, Gulf I, Kosovo, and any number of smaller military engagements throughout the globe it was emininently clear that the U.S. had the most sophisticated military and the most advanced means of force projection possessed by any state in human history. The invasion of Iraq has, as of now, served to demonstrate what the absolute limits of that force's effectiveness truly are. Prior to the invasion of Iraq I think that the perpetrators of Hariri's murder might have been afraid to challenge the status quo, in that they would have been subject to economic or diplomatic sanction by the U.S. and allies, a military strike (not necessarily an invasion), or some combination of all three. Now the U.S. is so heavily invested in Iraq that it cannot genuinely afford to "rock the boat" to that extent in Lebanon (or anywhere else in the Middle East). Moreover, many of the diplomatic and economic sanctions the U.S. might have brought to bear are unavailable because of the strains put on our alliances and our treasury.
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