Michael Barone at Real Clear Politics cites research by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, arguing that:
Two generations ago, Americans, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of deaths, changed minds in Germany and Japan. The Pew Global Project Attitude's metrics give us reason to believe that today's Americans, at far lower cost, are changing minds in the Muslim world.
There are several problems with this thesis. Barone notes that Pew surveys show a decline in the approval rating for "violence against civilians in the defense of Islam" in most Muslim countries (with the notable exception of Jordan). This is undoubtedly a hopeful development, but Barone makes no clear case that it may be attributed to US actions in Iraq or Afghanistan. The case is equally strong that the actions of Islamic extremists are the root cause of this change, as the decline is most dramatic in nations whose own civilians have been the target of Islamist terrorist attacks.
Barone notes also that "when asked whether democracy was a Western way of doing things or could work well in their own country, between 77 percent and 83 percent in Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Indonesia say it could work in their country -- in each case a significant increase from earlier surveys." Again, this is all well and good. But Barone disingenuously dismisses the fact that confidence in democracy has actually declined in both Turkey and Pakistan(from 50 to 48% in the former case, from 57% to a shocking 43% in the latter), arguably the US's closest allies in the "war on terror." Though a plurality in both countries still express confidence in democracy, the Pew report itself shows that majorities or pluralities in all the nations surveyed have had confidence in democracy going back to before the invasion of Iraq. Barone would contend that the net decrease in Pakistan and Turkey is the result of domestic affairs while the net increase in Indonesia, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan is the result of US actions, but this is a highly selective and speculative conclusion that can not be substantiated without further research.
The survey results that most unequivocally support Barone's thesis are the decrease both in "unfavorable" views of the US and approval of suicide attacks against US soldiers in Iraq. The former "change" is somewhat dubious, however, in that the US was still looked upon unfavorably by a clear majority in all of the nations surveyed but one (Morocco- 49%-44% favorable). Even if the invasion of Iraq can be credited for this change, one can not help but wonder whether the same incremental shift might have been achieved by less destructive means. The decrease in approval of suicide bombings in Iraq is more substantively encouraging, but here again Barone's optimism draws upon an incomplete picture. Though support for suicide bombings is down across the boards, a majority still express approval of the bombings in Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan. The only country where the approval-disapproval ration has reversed is Pakistan (in 2004 Pakistanis surveyed favored the bombins 46%-36%, now they oppose them 29%-56%). What this says about Pakistani attitudes toward US policy is mitigated, however, by the fact that Pakistan is one of only two countries surveyed in which confidence in Osama bin Laden has risen (+6%, a statistic made more worrisome by the high probability that Pakistan is the nation where bin Laden currently resides).
Moreover, support for the insurgency was a majority opinion in all the countries for which statistics were availabe but one (Turkey) as late as March of 2004. This would indicate that Muslim attitudes toward the invasion of Iraq are malleable. Developments since 2004 have decreased opposition to the Coalition mission (though again, such opposition remains a majority opinion in half of the countires surveyed), but subsequent developments could cause a reversal of that trend.
Barone would read the Pew statistics as evidence of the success of US policies since 9/11. Unfortunately, they do not support either this conclusion or an argument for the wisdom of US policies in the first place.
9 comments:
Dear Madman,
A quibble and a comment:
1) The Michael Barone piece is from a commentary at Real Clear Politics, not Commentary magazine.
2) Barone is pretty well versed in analysis of statistics and polls like these. I don't know that Barone would argue that the Pew poll provides any *definitive* proof that current U.S. policy in the Middle East is correct (can any poll do that?), but it certainly ought to give some pause to those who would argue that current U.S. policy has been disastrous in terms of "changing hearts and minds."
Dear Kate Marie,
1)Ooops. Thanks for the heads up.
2)I never claimed Barone deduced *definitive* proof. I took issue with his assertion that "[t]he Pew Global Project Attitude's metrics give us reason to believe that today's Americans, at far lower cost, are changing minds in the Muslim world." If Barone is so versed in the analysis of poll data he should realize that virtually all of the changes to which he refers might have been caused by the actions of Islamic extremists. His failure to note this is either disingenuous or an oversight.
Dear Madman,
But so many people keep arguing that the actions of the Muslims extremists have been fueled by our invasion of Iraq. If that's the case, and if Arab and other Muslim countries are reacting to those actions, then American policy in the region *has* had some affect on public perception of terrorism. I don't think it's too far-fetched to consider whether the spike of violence in the region has forced the people of the region to choose sides -- for or against Islamist terror.
Dear Kate Marie,
So the intention of US policy has been to cause a "spike of violence" that would force people to choose sides? Seems like a dubious plan to me.
The terror attacks that have changed opinions in the Muslim world have not been fueled by the invasion of Iraq. Many, like the bombings in Bali and Mombasa in 2002, happened prior to the invasion of Iraq. The event most responsible for recent the spike in Islamist terrorism is 9/11, as that has raised al-Qaeda's recruitment profile among extremists world-wide and spurred them to jump on the jihad bandwagon.
Dear Madman,
That the spike in Islamist violence, etc., *may* be partly an effect of U.S. policy (regime change, democracy promotion, etc.) does not imply that that was the direct intention of the policy. But for someone who cautions Barone against assuming U.S. policy has *anything* to do with the changing attitudes evinced by the poll, you sound awfully certain that the changing attitudes may be attributed wholly to Islamist terror attacks. The events in Iraq, for instance, have been cited by Walid Jumblatt (not sure of the spelling) as having had an impact on the movement to oust Syria, etc. from Lebanon.
In any event, it appears -- according to this poll, at least --that minds are beginning to change, so the tendency to dismiss out of hand the potential good effects of our current policy in the Middle East and Iraq and to argue that the Iraq war has *only* created recruits for Al Qaeda seems rather myopic to me.
Kate Marie,
So all Barone is doing is suggesting that US policy maybe had something to do with changing attitudes? Who is being myopic? If you look closely at Barone's piece I think you'll see he is "tweaking" the evidence a bit more than you make out.
"In any event, it appears -- according to this poll, at least --that minds are beginning to change"
Herein lies Barone's main problem. The Pew poll clearly shows that minds are not "beginning to change," rather minds were already changing prior to the invasion of Iraq. Shifts like increasing confidence in democracy and concern about Islamic extremism are long-term trends pre-dating the Iraq war. Barone seems ready to declare the Iraq war a greater success than WWII, but the statistics leave open the possibility that minds would have changed just as fast or even faster had the Iraq war never taken place.
Barone insists that these statistics provide a surer barometer of success than the frequency of car bombings in Iraq or the failure of the Iraqis to draft a constitution, but only the most biased form of statistical alchemy can turn the former into gold and the latter into lead.
Dear Madman,
Okay, Barone is just a hack tweaking statistical evidence to fit his preconceived notions. However, your rush to discredit any notion that current U.S. policy has resulted in changed minds in the Middle East seems just as biased to me. Clearly, the action in Iraq has *not* radicalized the majority of the public in Arab and Muslim countries, as those populations have continued to follow a trend of disapproving Islamist terror, etc. And your suggestion that minds might have changed more quickly had we not invaded Iraq seems at least as tendentiously eager to dismiss Barone's hypothesis as Barone is to prove it. Is there some statistical evidence that the rate of changed minds has slowed significantly since the invasion?
And you still have not explained the certainty with which you have proclaimed that terror attacks are solely to "thank" for these changing attitudes. On the one hand, increasing attacks (but not attacks in Iraq, apparently) are changing people's minds, and, on the other, the success of the effort to change hearts and minds can apparently be measured by the "frequency of car bombings in Iraq."
Dear Kate Marie,
I never stated with any certainty that Islamist terror attacks were the *definitive* cause of "changed minds," only that the statistical evidence points to that cause as much as any US policy, so that Barone's comparison of current US military efforts to WWII is at best poorly reasoned, at worst disingenuous. Whether or not the invasion of Iraq has "radicalized the majority of the public in the Arab world" is little indication of whether the policy has been a success.
As for my contention that minds might have changed just as quickly had we not invaded Iraq, the Pew statistics support it. The invasion of Iraq itself did little to change minds- the Pew study shows that as late as summer of 2004 most Muslims in all the countries surveyed but Turkey approved of suicide attacks against Coalition forces. That support has softened since 2004, but that bubble of good will may burst very quickly if the Coalition can not continue to produce observable milestones of improvement like January's elections. Meanwhile, other Pew statistics give evidence of disturbing retrograde trends, like the rise of confidence in Osama bin Laden in Jordan and Pakistan and a rise in support of violence against civilians in defense of Islam in Jordan. Barone dismisses this phenomenon in Jordan because it has a Palestinian majority, but even if that is so it casts a light on a major flaw in US policy. The Israel/Palestine issue is a fulcral issue for Muslims around the world in shaping attitudes toward the US, so if US poicy is not decreasing hostility among Palestinians it has little chance of influencing the Muslim world more broadly.
Dear Madman,
"Whether or not the invasion of Iraq has "radicalized the majority of the public in the Arab world" is little indication of whether the policy has been a success."
-- But, as I have suggested before, this poll should at least give some pause to those for whom the creation of Al Qaeda recruits is one of the reasons that they opposed the invasion of Iraq.
You suggested that the pattern of changed minds might have continued at a rate just as fast or "even faster;" it was the "even faster" impulse that I thought indicated some less-than-purely-academic interest in the interpretation of this poll. Unless there's some evidence that rates of "changed minds" have been *slowing* since Iraq, I can see no reason to suggest that minds would have changed "even faster" in the absence of the Iraq invasion.
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