Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine: Lessons to Live (or Die) By

 

 Joe Biden’s surprise visit to embattled Ukraine is the latest in a series of adept political maneuvers that have heightened the stakes of that conflict and fostered unity of purpose among the allies standing in defiance of Vladimir Putin. As the war enters its second year, questions of strategy and the search for an “end game” become more urgent. What is the path forward, and how can past experience help us find it?

            Ukraine is the third in a series of object lessons about the nature of modern warfare that have unfolded on the global stage in the past two decades. The conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine all make manifest a common principle. This truth may be stated succinctly: “An army that believes in its cause will fight; an army that does not believe in its cause will run.”

            This truism might seem too cliché to merit remark, but somehow its significance has eluded leaders throughout the world. To be sure, the lesson is not new. Many conflicts in recorded history, dating back to ancient times, corroborate its validity. But it is worth noting that the world of microchips, satellites, and precision bombs has not altered its saliency. No amount of technology can make warfare a purely mechanical process. Politics remains a durable and determinative factor in military affairs.

            What, then, does a comparison of the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine demonstrate, and how can such a comparison help world leaders make better decisions moving forward? The collapse of the Iraqi Army in the face of the ISIS assault of 2013 and of the Afghan Army in confrontation with the Taliban in 2021 stands in stark contrast to the resolve demonstrated by the Ukrainian Army in the past year. Juxtaposing the three conflicts demonstrates how decisive political factors can be to military outcomes. Both the Iraqi and Afghan armies possessed equivalent or superior numbers and armament relative to their respective opponents. The Ukrainian Army has been outgunned and outmanned from the very beginning.

            It thus must be very clear to world leaders, particularly the leadership of the NATO Alliance, that morale and motivation played a key role in all these events. But there seems to be a soft bigotry at work in the inferences drawn from these facts. European and American leaders appear to believe that the contrasting levels of commitment displayed by the soldiers of Iraq and Afghanistan on the one hand and the Ukraine on the other may be put down to “cultural” differences. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why NATO leaders are determined to make the same mistakes in Ukraine that they made in Iraq and Afghanistan.

           The people of Iraq and Afghanistan do not lack any of the potential for nationalistic conviction and commitment that the people of Ukraine have been proven to possess. The soldiers of Iraq and Afghanistan did not perform poorly for lack of patriotism, but because at the time of their deployment, their homelands were not true nation-states. Iraq and Afghanistan were both occupied by foreign powers, the leadership in Baghdad and Kabul were denied the autonomy and true powers of sovereign governments.

           This was, ironically (given my above remarks on the ways in which politics can trump technology), made most obvious to the soldiers of Iraq and Afghanistan by the state of their armaments. In Iraq, for example, at the time of the ISIS assault of 2013, the Iraqi Air Force had only two combat airplanes, both Cessna prop planes modified to carry a single Hellfire missile each. That was in contrast to the regime of Saddam Hussein, which had one of the largest air forces in the world, able to deploy hundreds of MiG, Mirage, and Sukhoi fighter aircraft.

This wide disparity in capability was demoralizing to the Iraqi Army of 2013 more for its political significance than its material, technological impact. The government of Saddam had been pathological and widely despised, but its ability to acquire and freely deploy advanced offensive weaponry demonstrated that it was truly sovereign. The Baghdad government of 2013 was just as clearly a client of the United States, prevented from arming their soldiers with the basic tools of a modern army by their colonial masters in Washington D.C.

            The Iraqi Army went up against ISIS with slightly better weaponry. They had light artillery and combat helicopters that ISIS did not possess. But the soldiers of ISIS were animated by religious fervor. They were willing to die in suicide attacks to make up for their inferior firepower. The soldiers of the Iraqi Army, in the face of such zealotry, were being asked to die in defense of a government that was obviously a puppet of Washington D.C. Is it really such a shock that many Iraqi soldiers did not feel this game was worth playing? Virtually the same dynamic was at work in Afghanistan, with identical results.

            The distinctive performance of the Ukrainian Army does not arise from differences in culture, but in context. Their Russian opponents do not exhibit any fraction of the zealous passion that animated ISIS or the Taliban. More importantly, Ukrainian soliders have never had to doubt that their national spirit is exerted in service of a government that is authentically sovereign. The Ukrainian Army was (and is) smaller than that of Russia, but well-armed and well-equipped with the current tools of war.

Moreover, though Ukraine has been materially dependent on foreign support of its war effort, Ukrainian leaders have never allowed such dependence to infringe upon their sovereign autonomy. This was publicly broadcast by Volodimir Zelensky’s famous declaration, in the face of American offers of transport to safety in the early days of the conflict, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” From that moment forward, the people of Ukraine have had reason to be confident that their leaders are setting their own agenda, without deference to the priorities of the US or any other foreign power.

Since the success of the NATO-Ukrainian partnership has depended upon the robustly nationalistic morale of the Ukrainian army and people, the worst thing that NATO leaders could do is to encroach upon or violate the sovereign dignity of Ukraine’s government or leaders. Yet when pundits and officials of the NATO nations speak publicly about the trajectory of the Ukraine conflict, they frequently entertain plans that would deeply offend their Ukrainian partners. A significant constituency among the NATO leadership seem to believe that a negotiated settlement could be reached allowing Russia to continue to occupy the Donbas region, the Crimea, and/or other Ukrainian territory currently held by Russian troops. The people and government of the Ukraine will never assent to such an accord.

It does not take much thought to realize why the same spirit that has animated Ukrainian resistance precludes a peace short of the total expulsion of Russian forces. The clear object of Russia’s offensive was to destroy the Ukrainian nation. For the resolution of this conflict to provide any assurance of Ukraine’s survival, it cannot legitimize the goals or methods of the Russian campaign to any degree. Thus the sanction of Russia’s occupation of any portion of Ukrainian territory will be perceived as tantamount to an invitation to attempt the destruction of Ukraine again, at some time in the indefinite future. Put yourself in the position of any of the middle-aged Ukrainian women who have taken up arms in defense of their homeland, imagine what they think as they look at their granddaughters, wondering if those children will have to live through the same cataclysm again, and you can quickly understand why any resolution of the conflict that does not entail a complete withdrawal of Russian forces will not be politically feasible in Ukraine.

If NATO continues to proceed as if a territorial “compromise” is achievable, the strategic partnership with Ukraine will eventually go sideways, producing outcomes comparable (in kind, if not degree) to what was seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is unlikely, given the robust spirit that has developed among Ukraine’s people and soldiers, that any pressure from or foot-dragging by NATO will shatter Ukrainian morale as was done to the armies of Iraq in 2013 and Afghanistan in 2021. But such a collapse is not impossible, given world enough and time. If you deprive Ukrainian soldiers and citizens of their nationalist aspirations, you deprive them of an asset that has been much more vital to their military success than money, supplies, or munitions.

There are catastrophes that fall short of an unlikely collapse of Ukrainian political will, however. It would be surprising if Volodimir Zelensky’s government had not already begun researching alternative sources of support, should NATO’s will and enthusiasm begin to flag. Kiev could strike out on its own, producing a far more volatile and unpredictable conflict that might induce horrific destruction and loss of life. The effects of such a development on the battlefield, on the internal politics of Ukraine, and on its relationship with the NATO allies could be profoundly tragic. There is little that Russia can do at this juncture to “win” the war, but there is much that NATO could do to lose it. 

What, then, are the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan that can be applied to the conflict in the Ukraine? They boil down to this: success for NATO depends upon treating Ukraine as a genuine strategic partner, and not as a client or proxy. Any attempt to strongarm the government or people of Ukraine into a “compromise” they cannot accept will undermine all the progress toward a just resolution of the conflict that has been made thus far. The final goal of all partners in the anti-Putin coalition must be the total and complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from all of Ukraine. For that to happen, the Ukrainians must be supplied with the tools and weapons that will allow them to mount a successful offensive against superior Russian numbers.

          Vladimir Putin will never be dislodged from the Ukraine by purely diplomatic means. His political survival depends on the claim that this absurd, pointlessly destructive war has achieved some semblance of a strategic goal. For such a claim to be tenable, Putin must hold on to some portion of the Ukrainian territory he has annexed. He will never cease fighting unless his opponents assent to some portion of his territorial claims, but this is a concession that the leaders and people of Ukraine will never give. He thus must be driven out of Ukraine by force. Only when it is clear that his army cannot defend its position inside Ukraine will Putin have motive to come to the negotiating table, on the chance that he can barter an armistice in exchange for exemption from liability for the costs of the war.

            NATO leaders have a stark choice. One option is to totally and unconditionally support the Ukrainians in their campaign to restore the territorial integrity of their homeland. The only other choice is to accept defeat, and to face a world in which Vladimir Putin, to one degree or another, gets to set the rules of international relations. For the sake of the welfare of the global community, we must hope that NATO leaders choose correctly.